Wong v. Factor-Koyama
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case stems from a complaint filed by Catherine Factor-Koyama against Alexander Tam Wong for specific performance, sum of money, and damages. Koyama alleged that Wong refused to execute a deed of absolute sale and surrender the condominium certificate of title for a property she had purchased from him. She further claimed that Wong padlocked the property while she was abroad, and upon her request to open it, he physically assaulted her and took her belongings. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued summons to Wong, which the sheriff attempted to serve at his residence multiple times. Due to Wong's absence and his caretaker's refusal to receive the summons, the sheriff resorted to substituted service, leaving the documents with the caretaker. After Wong failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, the RTC declared him in default. Wong subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons. The RTC denied this motion, upholding the validity of the substituted service. Wong then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, challenging the RTC's orders declaring him in default and denying his motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright, deeming certiorari the wrong remedy and noting that the denial of the motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order. The Petition: Alexander Tam Wong seeks review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. He contends that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari, arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by declaring him in default and denying his motion to dismiss without valid service of summons. Wong maintains that the substituted service was improper as the sheriff did not exert sufficient efforts to personally serve him or ascertain the impossibility of such service. He further argues that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over his person. However, the Supreme Court notes that Wong later participated in cross-examination in the RTC and filed a notice of appeal after the RTC rendered its decision, suggesting that these actions may constitute voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction and that the issues raised could be addressed on appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Wong. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright petitioner Wong's Petition for Certiorari. Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner Wong in default and in denying his Motion to Dismiss.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Supreme Court held that while the substituted service of summons was improper, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong's person through his voluntary appearance. The Court also affirmed the CA's dismissal of the certiorari petition, stating it was the improper remedy for the assailed orders.
Ratio Decidendi
On the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Wong: The Court found that the Sheriff's Return did not sufficiently establish the impossibility of personal service, rendering the substituted service improper. However, the Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the person can also be acquired through voluntary appearance. The Court pointed to Wong's active participation in the hearing on January 23, 2009, where he extensively cross-examined Koyama, as a voluntary submission to the RTC's jurisdiction. By availing himself of the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, Wong effectively acknowledged the RTC's control over the case and his person as the defendant, thereby curing any defect in the service of summons. The Court noted that Wong's filing of a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction did not constitute voluntary appearance, but his subsequent active participation did. On the propriety of the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals: The Court agreed with the CA that a Petition for Certiorari was not the proper remedy for the assailed RTC orders. Regarding the order of default, the CA correctly cited Cerezo v. Tuazon, outlining several remedies available, including a motion to set aside the order of default, a motion for new trial, a petition for relief, or an appeal from the judgment. While a petition for certiorari may be available if grave abuse of discretion attended the declaration of default, the CA found no such grave abuse. Concerning the order denying the Motion to Dismiss, the CA correctly characterized it as interlocutory. The Court reiterated that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari; the proper recourse is to appeal the order after a final judgment has been rendered. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure or judgment, but to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner Wong in default and in denying his Motion to Dismiss: As stated in the previous point, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion regarding the order of default. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that an interlocutory order denying the Motion to Dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari; the proper recourse is to appeal the order after a final judgment has been rendered. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure or judgment, but to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Main Doctrine
A party who actively participates in a hearing after an order of default, despite the order not being lifted, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not subject to a petition for certiorari; the proper remedy is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.