Quesada v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Epitacio Asuncion owned Lot No. 225-B, a portion of which was leased to Claro San Luis. Querubin Derequito, predecessor-in-interest of respondents, occupied a portion of the leased land by converting a part of the Balabag River into a fishpond. Querubin filed a forcible entry case against San Luis, which resulted in a decision favoring San Luis, ordering Querubin to renounce possession of the encroached area and limit his fishpond operations. Despite the finality of this judgment, it was not implemented. Procedural History: After Epitacio Asuncion's death and the expiration of San Luis' lease, respondents succeeded in possessing the disputed land. In 1985, San Luis and petitioners filed a complaint to revive the 1975 judgment and recover possession and damages. This case, later amended to implead respondents, resulted in a Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision in favor of petitioners, reviving the earlier judgment and awarding damages. Respondents appealed this decision, but their appeal was denied due to late filing. Subsequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the Court of Appeals, assailing the RTC's decision. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, vacating the RTC's decision and ruling that the action to revive the judgment had prescribed. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the appellate court erred in dismissing their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction. They contend that the appellate court wrongly concluded that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in modifying the original judgment by awarding damages and that the action to revive the judgment had prescribed. Petitioners assert that the RTC's decision was valid, that the damages awarded were for the period since 1977, and that the action to revive the judgment was filed within the ten-year prescriptive period from the finality of the original judgment in 1976, as a writ of execution had been issued but not enforced within the five-year period.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction. Whether the action to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 8863 had prescribed. Whether the trial court erred in modifying the revived judgment by awarding monetary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Iloilo City, dated July 8, 2002, in Civil Case No. 16681 is reinstated.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the certiorari petition: The Court held that the respondents should not have been allowed to avail of the remedy of certiorari when they had lost their remedy of appeal due to filing their notice of appeal beyond the reglementary period. The Court found that respondents were represented by counsel, and notice to counsel is notice to the client, thus negating their claim of not being aware of the proceedings. The presumption of authority of a lawyer to appear for a client is strong and does not require written authorization. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the certiorari petition. On the issue of prescription: The Supreme Court ruled that the action to revive the judgment had not prescribed. The judgment in the forcible entry case became final and executory on September 15, 1976, when the motion for reconsideration was denied. The action for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 16681) was filed on August 26, 1985, which was well within the ten-year prescriptive period from the finality of the judgment. The Court clarified that the ten-year prescriptive period for reviving a judgment is counted from the date it becomes final and executory. The fact that the writ of execution was not enforced within five years did not preclude an action to revive the judgment, as long as it was filed within the ten-year period. On the modification of the revived judgment by awarding damages: The Court found no error in the trial court's award of damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. The damages awarded represented losses suffered by the petitioners due to the respondents' continued withholding of possession of the lot since 1977, when San Luis' lease contract expired and petitioners acquired his rights. The Court emphasized that the relief granted in an action to revive a judgment depends on the contents of the complaint for revival, which in this case included claims for possession and damages, not solely on what was granted in the original judgment sought to be revived. The complaint for revival of judgment and recovery of possession and damages had two causes of action: revival of the forcible entry judgment and recovery of possession and damages for violation of petitioners' rights since 1977.
Main Doctrine
An action to revive a judgment, if filed within the ten-year prescriptive period from the finality of the judgment, is not barred by prescription, even if the writ of execution was not enforced within the five-year period. Damages may be awarded in an action to revive a judgment, representing losses incurred due to the withholding of possession since the expiration of the lease.