Topacio v. Banco Filipino
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio obtained a loan of ₱400,000.00 from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. The petitioners defaulted on their loan payments, leading the respondent bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at public auction, with the respondent bank emerging as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the respondent bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to gain control of the foreclosed property. 2. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted the respondent bank's petition for a writ of possession, conditioned on the posting of a bond. However, the petitioners filed a petition to set aside the auction sale and the writ of possession, leading the RTC to issue a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The case experienced significant delays due to postponements sought by both parties. The RTC, citing failure to prosecute, dismissed the respondent's petition for a writ of possession. This dismissal order was not served on the respondent. Years later, after the respondent bank resumed operations, it filed a motion to clarify the dismissal order and sought an alias writ of possession. The RTC clarified that the dismissal pertained only to the main case for the writ of possession and initially denied the motion for an alias writ. Upon reconsideration, the RTC set aside its dismissal order and granted the alias writ of possession. The petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, prompting the present petition. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a review on certiorari of the CA's decision, arguing that the RTC erred in affirming the order for an alias writ of possession. Their primary contentions are that the December 16, 1986 dismissal order constituted an adjudication on the merits and had become final and executory, thus barring further action through res judicata. They also argue that a writ of possession, issued in 1984, could no longer be enforced by a mere motion after more than five years had elapsed, as per Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and should have been pursued through an independent action. The petitioners contend that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to issue the alias writ under these circumstances.
Issue(s)
Whether the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order for failure to prosecute attained finality and constituted res judicata. Whether the writ of possession issued on February 16, 1984, could still be enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of more than five (5) years from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of possession.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The August 26, 2002 Decision and the March 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389 are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the finality of the Dismissal Order and res judicata: The Court held that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order never attained finality because it was not properly served on the respondent's counsel, either personally or by registered mail. The petitioners did not dispute the CA's finding that the records failed to show service of the dismissal order. Consequently, the dismissal order never attained finality, and the principle of res judicata did not apply. The Court also rejected the petitioners' belated claim that the respondent's motion for reconsideration of the September 18, 1992 Order was filed out of time, as this issue was raised for the first time on appeal, violating the rule against changing theories on appeal. On the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: The Court reiterated its ruling in Paderes v. Court of Appeals and Sta. Ana v. Menla that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which governs execution by motion or independent action within five years, applies only to civil actions and not to special proceedings. The petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Act No. 3135 is not an ordinary civil action but a judicial proceeding governed by specific provisions of law. The Court emphasized that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure is ministerial and issues as a matter of course upon compliance with legal requirements. On the RTC's issuance of an alias writ of possession: The Court found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the alias writ of possession. The dismissal for failure to prosecute was considered unfounded and based on a technicality, especially since the case had been prolonged by postponements at the instance of both parties. The RTC correctly ruled that the dismissal order was not an adjudication on the merits. Furthermore, the revival of the writ of possession through a motion for reconsideration was deemed seasonably filed, as the running of the five-year period was interrupted by the erroneous issuance of a preliminary injunction, and the February 16, 1984 order never attained finality. The respondent, as the winning bidder, had an absolute right to a writ of possession, which had been issued and bonded, and no redemption occurred.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is a ministerial duty of the court. The five-year period for execution by motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not apply to special proceedings like the issuance of a writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as it is not an ordinary civil action. Furthermore, a dismissal for failure to prosecute does not attain finality if there is no proper service of the dismissal order on the respondent.