Lamsis v. Dong-E
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The case involves a dispute over ownership and possession of an untitled parcel of land (Lot No. 1) in Baguio City. Respondent Margarita Semon Dong-e claimed ownership tracing her family's occupation to 1922 through her grandfather, Ap-ap. Her family obtained a survey plan in 1964, declared the property for taxation, and executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of her father, Gilbert Semon. Gilbert Semon later allowed his in-laws, Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma (parents of petitioners Delfin Lamsis and Agustin Kitma), to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1. Upon Gilbert Semon's death, Lot No. 1 was allotted to Margarita. Petitioners Delfin and Agustin, and later Maynard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. (purchasers from Delfin and Agustin), occupied portions of Lot No. 1, with Delfin and Agustin allegedly expanding their occupation and selling parts of the land. Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance, and damages. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Margarita, declaring the transfers to Maynard and Jose void, ordering petitioners to vacate, and awarding attorney's fees and costs. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, initially denied but later reinstated. The Petition: Petitioners argued that the CA disregarded material facts, that they acquired the property by prescription, and that the RTC lacked jurisdiction due to the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), which vests jurisdiction over ancestral land claims in the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). They also contended that the NCIP case should take precedence.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial court’s decision. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, affirming the CA's decision. The Court held that the petitioners are barred by laches from raising the issue of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court also found that petitioners failed to prove acquisition by prescription and that the pendency of an ancestral land claim before the NCIP does not constitute litis pendentia with a reivindicatory action.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged disregard of material facts: The Court held that the petitioners' assignment of error raised questions of fact, which are beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari. The Court reiterated that factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, when supported by evidence, are accorded great respect. Even if the Deed of Quitclaim were inadmissible, respondent's claims were sufficiently supported by other documentary and testimonial evidence, including tax declarations and survey plans spanning several decades, indicating continuous exercise of ownership rights. The Court found respondent's version of how petitioners occupied the property, corroborated by documentary evidence, more credible. On acquisition by prescription: The Court found that petitioners admitted occupying the property by tolerance of the owner. Such possession, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless there is express repudiation communicated to the owner. The Court noted that acts of possessory character executed by mere tolerance are inadequate for prescription. The sales made by petitioners Delfin and Agustin in 1998 occurred too late to attain the 30-year prescriptive period. On the jurisdiction of the trial court under RA 8371 (IPRA): The Court applied the doctrine of laches, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Petitioners raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time before the Supreme Court, eight years after the complaint was filed, after participating in the proceedings before the RTC and CA, and after receiving adverse decisions. Despite being aware of the IPRA and its implications, as evidenced by their cross-examination of a witness regarding the CSTFAL's loss of jurisdiction, they never questioned the RTC's jurisdiction until their appeal to the Supreme Court. This undue delay and participation in the proceedings barred them from raising the jurisdictional objection. On the precedence of the NCIP case over the reivindicatory action: The Court clarified that an application for a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding, which does not create or vest ownership but merely recognizes existing ownership. Therefore, it does not constitute litis pendentia with a reivindicatory action, which squarely adjudicates ownership. The elements of litis pendentia, particularly the third element (identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for such that any judgment would amount to res judicata), were not met. Consequently, there was no basis for suspending or dismissing the reivindicatory case in favor of the NCIP proceedings, nor was there forum-shopping.
Main Doctrine
A party who fails to raise a jurisdictional objection at the earliest opportunity, despite awareness and opportunity to do so, is barred by laches from raising it on appeal, even if the issue of jurisdiction may generally be raised at any stage of the proceedings.