Cabral v. Uy
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns the criminal liability of land developers for selling subdivision lots without the requisite license from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 957. Respondent Jacinto Uy, chairman of Moldex Realty, Inc., and other officers, entered into a joint venture to develop a residential subdivision. Moldex applied for a license to sell subdivision lots but was initially denied. Subsequently, a criminal complaint was filed against the respondents by petitioner Victoria P. Cabral, alleging that she was the rightful owner of the land and that the respondents had offered to acquire it from her, which she refused due to a pending cancellation case against the seller. Procedural History: Following the criminal complaint, a criminal information was filed against the Moldex officers for selling subdivision lots without a license. The respondents moved to quash the information, arguing that the HLURB, not the regular courts, had exclusive jurisdiction, and that subsequent issuance of a license to sell would extinguish their criminal liability. The trial court denied these motions. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which granted a temporary restraining order. Ultimately, the CA upheld the trial court's jurisdiction but dismissed the case, reasoning that the subsequent issuance of the license to sell extinguished the criminal liability. The petitioner sought reconsideration, which the CA denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: The petitioner, Victoria P. Cabral, filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision to dismiss the criminal case. The core arguments presented to the Supreme Court revolve around two key issues: first, whether the public prosecutor and the trial court possess jurisdiction over criminal violations of P.D. 957, and second, whether the subsequent issuance of a license to sell by the HLURB retroactively extinguishes the criminal liability of developers for selling lots prior to obtaining such a license. The Office of the Solicitor General joined the petitioner in seeking the reversal of the CA's decision.
Issue(s)
Whether or not the office of the public prosecutor and the trial court have jurisdiction over criminal actions for violation of P.D. 957. Whether or not HLURB’s subsequent issuance to Moldex of a license to sell extinguished respondents Uy, et al.’s criminal liability for selling subdivision lots prior to the issuance of such license.
Ruling
The Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals, and REINSTATES the order of the Regional Trial Court denying respondents’ omnibus motion to quash and motion for judicial determination of probable cause.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether or not the office of the public prosecutor and the trial court have jurisdiction over criminal actions for violation of P.D. 957: The Court ruled that the public prosecutor's office has the authority to file criminal informations for violations of P.D. 957, and the trial court has the power to hear and adjudicate such actions. This is because the penalty prescribed for violations of P.D. 957, which includes a fine of ₱20,000.00 and imprisonment of not exceeding 10 years or both, falls within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Court cited its ruling in Sia v. People to support this conclusion, affirming that the penalty dictates the jurisdiction of the court in such criminal cases. On Whether or not HLURB’s subsequent issuance to Moldex of a license to sell extinguished respondents Uy, et al.’s criminal liability for selling subdivision lots prior to the issuance of such license: The Court held that the subsequent issuance of a license to sell by the HLURB does not extinguish the criminal liability of the developers for selling subdivision lots without the prior issuance of such a license. Presidential Decree (P.D.) 957 was enacted to regulate the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums for the public good, and Section 5 explicitly prohibits such sales without a prior HLURB license. The offense is considered malum prohibitum, meaning it is wrong because the law prohibits it, and criminal intent or malice is immaterial. The crime is committed by the act of selling without the license, regardless of the subsequent acquisition of the license or the developer's good faith. The Court distinguished this case from Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., clarifying that while the absence of a license might not be sufficient to invalidate a contract, it does not absolve the developer from criminal liability for violating P.D. 957. The subsequent issuance of a license cannot retroactively erase the offense committed.
Main Doctrine
The subsequent issuance of a license to sell by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) does not extinguish the criminal liability of a developer for selling subdivision lots without the prior issuance of such license, as the offense is considered malum prohibitum and the commission of the act itself, regardless of intent or subsequent compliance, constitutes the violation.