Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Quintin B. Saludaga, then Municipal Mayor, and SPO2 Fiel E. Genio, a PNP Member, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charge stemmed from their alleged act of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of two Barangay Day Care Centers with the late Olimpio Legua, a private individual and a non-licensed contractor, without conducting a competitive public bidding. This was alleged to have caused undue injury to the government by depriving it of the opportunity to obtain the best price and by awarding the contract to an unqualified individual, contrary to Section 356 of the Local Government Code and COA Circular No. 91-368. Procedural History: The case was initially filed with the Sandiganbayan Third Division and docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319. The Third Division granted the petitioners' Motion to Quash and dismissed the information on June 14, 2002, for failure to allege and prove the amount of actual damages to the government, an essential element of the crime. Subsequently, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of amending and re-filing the information. The OSP re-filed an Information on August 17, 2007, with the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, charging the petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefit to a private person to the prejudice of the government. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division's Resolution dated July 14, 2008, which denied their Motion for Preliminary Investigation, and its subsequent denial of their Motion for Reconsideration on August 13, 2008. Petitioners argued that the re-filed Information constituted a substitution of the original Information or, at the very least, a substantial amendment, necessitating a new preliminary investigation. They also contended that newly discovered evidence warranted a re-examination of the finding of probable cause. The core issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the two modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019—causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits—constitute distinct offenses requiring a new preliminary investigation.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order a preliminary investigation despite the second Information constituting a substituted Information. Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order a preliminary investigation, considering the second Information contained substantial amendments. Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order a preliminary investigation, despite newly discovered evidence mandating a re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 14, 2008, denying the petitioners' motion for preliminary investigation, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the second Information constituted a substituted Information requiring a new preliminary investigation: The Court held that the second Information did not constitute a substituted Information. While the mode of commission was modified from alleging "undue injury" to "unwarranted benefit," both allegations fall under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The disjunctive "or" in the law signifies two modes of committing the offense, not two distinct offenses. Therefore, changing the mode of commission does not alter the nature of the offense charged, and no new preliminary investigation is required. The Court cited jurisprudence, including Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, which clarifies that an accused may be charged under either mode or both. The petitioners' reliance on Teehankee v. Madayag is misplaced as that case involved a true substitution of information. On the issue of whether the second Information contained substantial amendments requiring a new preliminary investigation: The Court found no substantial amendment that would warrant a new preliminary investigation. The second Information was founded on the same transaction as the first, which was the entering into a Pakyaw Contract. The evidentiary requirements for both the prosecution and the defense remained the same. The shift from alleging "undue injury" to "unwarranted benefits" was merely a change in the mode of committing the offense under the same provision of law. The Court distinguished this from Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, where the recital of facts constituting the offense was definitely altered, thus requiring a new preliminary investigation. In this case, there was no substantial amendment to speak of, and the original Information was already dismissed, leaving nothing to be amended. On the issue of newly discovered evidence mandating a re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause: The Court found this contention to be without merit. The alleged newly discovered evidence, an affidavit from a COA Auditor, was executed in 2000 and was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. It was considered during the preliminary investigation and was annexed to the petitioners' Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation. Therefore, it could not be considered newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, which requires evidence discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence. Furthermore, the determination of probable cause is within the exclusive province of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Court will not interfere without good and compelling reasons, such as grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
The disjunctive "or" in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 signifies two modes of committing the offense, not two distinct offenses. Therefore, a modification in the Information from alleging "undue injury" to "unwarranted benefit" does not constitute a substitution or substantial amendment requiring a new preliminary investigation.