Compania General de Tabacos v. Insular Collector of Customs
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The appellant, Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, paid P1,427.26 under protest to the Insular Collector of Customs in Manila. This payment was made pursuant to Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, which levies a wharfage charge on Philippine products exported from the Islands. Procedural History: The appellant filed an action to recover the sum, alleging illegal collection. The judgment appealed from absolved the defendant Insular Collector of Customs. The Petition: The appellant contended that Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, was repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, imposing a wharfage charge, was impliedly repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law, which prohibits export duties. Whether the wharfage duties collected under Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, are in fact export duties.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, was not repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law. The collected sum was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of implied repeal: The Court held that an implied repeal arises only when the new and old laws are absolutely incompatible. In this case, there is no such incompatibility between Section 11 of the Jones Law and Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909. Section 11 of the Jones Law prohibits the collection of export duties, while Section 14 of the Act of August 5, 1909, refers to wharfage charges. The Court noted that Congress itself, in the Tariff Law of 1913, expressly repealed Section 13 (Export Duties) of the Act of August 5, 1909, but preserved Section 14 (Wharfage), indicating a distinction between the two. Furthermore, Section 11 of the Jones Law is a general provision, whereas Section 14 of the Act of August 5, 1909, is a special provision. The rule is that a general law does not repeal a special one unless expressly stated or they are incompatible. The Court found no intention to repeal the special law on wharfage. The dissenting opinion argued for incompatibility, stating that any tax accruing by reason of exportation is an export duty, regardless of its designation. On whether wharfage duties are export duties: The Court found this question abstract and not applicable to the case at bar, as there was no proof that the articles in question passed through any government wharf. The Court also pointed out that Congress, by placing Section 13 under the caption "Export Duties" and Section 14 under "Wharfage" in the Act of August 5, 1909, considered them distinct. The dissenting opinion strongly disagreed, asserting that the language of the law and established jurisprudence classify such a tax as an export duty, and that calling it a "wharfage" charge does not alter its nature as a burden on exportation.
Main Doctrine
Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, which imposes a wharfage charge, was not impliedly repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law, which prohibits the collection of export duties, because wharfage and export duties are distinct, and a general law does not repeal a special law unless expressly stated or incompatible.