Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Tan Tiong Bio paid in full for a lot in Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate). Fil-Estate failed to deliver the title and refund the purchase price. Respondent discovered the lot was inexistent and filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials, including petitioner Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner), the Corporate Secretary. Procedural History: In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied any participation in the transactions and claimed the handwritten approval cited by respondent was not hers. Based on this, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner. The Pasig City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the perjury complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition for review, also dismissed the complaint motu proprio. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the DOJ's resolution, holding that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing without clearly stating the facts and law, and by misapplying Section 12 instead of Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, asserting that the constitutional requirement for clear and distinct findings applies only to courts of justice, not to executive departments like the DOJ, and that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows motu proprio dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for review. Whether Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies to resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice. Whether the Department of Justice correctly dismissed the petition for review motu proprio under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal.
Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 and January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for review: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, as the prosecutor does not determine guilt or innocence but merely ascertains probable cause. The DOJ, in reviewing a prosecutor's order or resolution, is not a quasi-judicial body. Therefore, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires decisions of courts of justice to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based, does not extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. The Court emphasized that preliminary investigations are merely investigative or inquisitorial powers for the purpose of obtaining information for future judicial action. On whether Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies to resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not apply to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. The Court reiterated its ruling in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. The constitutional provision specifically pertains to "courts of justice." The Court distinguished this from cases involving the Ombudsman's evaluation of a complaint, which has different procedural rules. The Court clarified that the nature of the proceeding before the DOJ in reviewing a prosecutor's resolution is investigative, not adjudicatory. On whether the Department of Justice correctly dismissed the petition for review motu proprio under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal: The Supreme Court affirmed the DOJ's action. The Court explained that Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the Secretary to dismiss a petition for review motu proprio on grounds such as the absence of any reversible error. The use of the word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution did not alter the nature of the action, as it was used in conjunction with the motu proprio dismissal. The Court also clarified the distinction between Section 7 and Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, noting that Section 7 provides grounds for outright dismissal when certain conditions are met, while Section 12 outlines the general disposition powers of the Secretary, including motu proprio dismissal. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
Main Doctrine
The Department of Justice (DOJ) in reviewing a prosecutor's resolution is not acting as a quasi-judicial body, and therefore, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring decisions to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based does not apply to DOJ resolutions. The DOJ Secretary may dismiss a petition for review motu proprio under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, and the use of the word "outright" in such dismissal does not alter the nature of the action.