People v. Tibong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jaren Tibong y Culla-ag was indicted for attempted rape for allegedly attempting to rape AAA, his first cousin, while she was sleeping in the basement of his parents' house. The information alleged that he removed her pajamas and panty, held her vagina, fondled her breasts, and attempted to have sexual intercourse against her will. AAA testified that days before the incident, petitioner's wife left after a misunderstanding with him. On the night of the incident, petitioner arrived and slept in the living room. AAA fell asleep but was awakened by petitioner undressing her. She resisted, but petitioner pulled down her pajamas and panties again, mashed her breasts, and stated they would have sexual intercourse and keep it a secret. She resisted, and he forced her to lie down, covering her mouth when she tried to shout. Petitioner then went to the CD player, and AAA seized the opportunity to escape, taking her cell phone and bag, and fleeing to her brother's house. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and imposed a penalty of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that his acts did not constitute attempted rape but acts of lasciviousness, citing Perez v. Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the overt acts of the petitioner constitute the commencement of the commission of rape, thereby establishing attempted rape. Whether the petitioner's acts constitute attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of October 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31644 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the overt acts of the petitioner constitute the commencement of the commission of rape, thereby establishing attempted rape: The Court held that the petitioner's acts, as narrated by AAA, indisputably showed his intent to have, and his being bent on consummating, carnal knowledge of AAA. The definition of attempt under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. AAA's testimony revealed that petitioner removed her pajamas and panty, mashed her breasts, and forced her to lie down, all while stating his intent to have sexual intercourse. Crucially, during cross-examination, AAA testified that petitioner "was trying to force it on me but I covered my vagina" and that his "brief was already lowered down to the middle of his upper leg." These acts, coupled with the intent to lie with her, clearly demonstrate the commencement of the commission of rape, not merely acts of lasciviousness. The fact that AAA escaped before carnal knowledge could be consummated does not negate the attempt, as the cause of non-completion was her escape and defense, not petitioner's spontaneous desistance. On the issue of whether the petitioner's acts constitute attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness: The Court distinguished between rape and acts of lasciviousness, noting that rape requires the intent to lie with a woman, while acts of lasciviousness do not. The Court found that petitioner's actions and statements clearly indicated an intent to have sexual intercourse with AAA. His removal of her undergarments, fondling of her breasts, and attempt to force her down, along with his explicit statement of intent to have sexual intercourse, go beyond mere acts of lasciviousness and demonstrate the commencement of the commission of rape. The ruling in Perez v. Court of Appeals, cited by the petitioner, was distinguished because in that case, there was "no showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ," whereas in the present case, AAA testified that the petitioner "was trying to force it on me but I covered my vagina" and his brief was lowered, indicating a direct attempt at penetration. Therefore, the acts constituted attempted rape.
Main Doctrine
The overt acts of the accused, including removing the victim's pajamas and panties, fondling her breasts, and attempting to force her down, coupled with his statement of intent to have sexual intercourse, sufficiently establish the commencement of the commission of rape, thus constituting attempted rape, especially when the victim resisted and the accused's brief was also lowered.