Yusay v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay owned a 1,044-square-meter parcel of land in Mandaluyong City, which they used partly as their residence and partly for rental income, housing nine other families. The City of Mandaluyong, through its Sangguniang Panglungsod, adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, authorizing the City Mayor to initiate legal steps for the expropriation of this land to develop it for low-cost housing for deserving but less privileged city inhabitants. The resolution cited the occupation of the land by financially hard-up families for about ten years, the owners' refusal to negotiate for its sale, and the public interest and social justice benefits of expropriation. 2. Procedural History: Alarmed by Resolution No. 552, the Spouses Yusay filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, seeking to annul the resolution. The RTC initially dismissed the petition, ruling that certiorari and prohibition were not proper remedies against a legislative act and that the suit was premature. However, upon the Yusays' motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed its decision, declared Resolution No. 552 void, and found the expropriation to be without due process and not for public use. The City of Mandaluyong appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the RTC's order, upholding the validity of Resolution No. 552 and finding no sufficient showing of lack of due process. The CA ruled that notice to the property owners of legislative hearings was not a requirement and that the resolution was presumed valid. 3. The Petition: The Spouses Yusay filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, questioning whether the validity of Resolution No. 552 could be assailed before its implementation and if a citizen must await the takeover of their property before seeking judicial nullification of an unjust expropriation. The Supreme Court, however, focused on the propriety of the remedies sought. It held that certiorari and prohibition were not available against the Sangguniang Panglungsod's adoption of Resolution No. 552 because it was a legislative act, not a judicial or quasi-judicial one. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), expropriation must be authorized by an ordinance, not merely a resolution, making the resolution insufficient to initiate expropriation proceedings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the CA's decision, albeit on different grounds, finding that the RTC erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue(s)
Whether certiorari and prohibition were proper remedies against the adoption of Resolution No. 552 by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Whether Resolution No. 552, adopted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod, was sufficient to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain for expropriation proceedings. Whether the suit filed by the Spouses Yusay was premature.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that certiorari and prohibition were not available remedies under the circumstances and that the Regional Trial Court gravely erred in giving due course to the petition. The Court sustained the CA's result, albeit on different grounds, finding that the RTC should not have entertained the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and prohibition: The Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure lies only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The Sangguniang Panglungsod, in adopting Resolution No. 552, was acting as a legislative and policy-making body, not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, certiorari was not a proper remedy. Furthermore, the adoption of a resolution, which expresses the sentiment or opinion of the legislative body on a specific matter, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Prohibition, similarly, is directed against proceedings without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and it was not applicable here as the Sangguniang Panglungsod was not performing judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions but merely expressing its collective sentiment. On the sufficiency of Resolution No. 552 for expropriation: The Court emphasized that under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), a local government unit may exercise the power of eminent domain only when acting pursuant to an ordinance, not a resolution. A resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion, while an ordinance is a law of a permanent character. The Local Government Code of 1991 explicitly requires an ordinance for the exercise of eminent domain, a departure from the previous Local Government Code (BP 337) which allowed a resolution. The Court cited Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation to support the requirement of an ordinance. Thus, Resolution No. 552 was insufficient to authorize the initiation of expropriation proceedings. On the prematurity of the suit: The Court found that the suit filed by the Spouses Yusay was premature. The power of eminent domain can only be exercised by the City through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. Until such a complaint is filed, no expropriation proceeding exists, and the property owners cannot be deprived of their property. The adoption of Resolution No. 552 was merely an initial step and did not constitute an act of encroachment, excess, or usurpation that would warrant immediate judicial intervention through certiorari or prohibition. The proper recourse would have been to challenge the expropriation proceedings once they were formally initiated, or to raise the lack of an ordinance as a defense in the expropriation case itself.
Main Doctrine
A resolution by a Sanggunian Panglungsod authorizing the City Mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings is insufficient; an ordinance is required under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Certiorari and prohibition do not lie against the legislative act of adopting a resolution, as it does not involve judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and the suit is premature until expropriation proceedings are formally filed.