Cahilig v. Terencio
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Soterania G. Siñel executed real estate mortgages on a portion of Lot 402 in favor of Moneytrend Lending Corporation to secure two promissory notes. Moneytrend Lending Corporation later assigned these notes and mortgages to Mercantile Credit Resources Corporation. Due to non-payment, Mercantile Credit Resources Corporation foreclosed the mortgages extrajudicially, acquired the property as the highest bidder, and obtained a certificate of sale. After Soterania Siñel failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period, a final deed of sale was issued to Mercantile Credit Resources Corporation. 2. Procedural History: Mercantile Credit Resources Corporation filed an ex-parte motion for a writ of possession, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, granted. Petitioners Viola Cahilig and Antonio G. Siñel, Jr. opposed this, with Cahilig filing a motion for reconsideration and Siñel, Jr. submitting a third-party claimant's affidavit asserting ownership based on alleged prior deeds of sale from their mother. The RTC granted an alias writ of possession, which was implemented, leading to Viola Cahilig's alleged forcible ejection. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC's orders. The CA dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the claim that petitioners were third parties holding the property adversely to the mortgagor. The CA subsequently denied their motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: Petitioners Viola Cahilig and Antonio G. Siñel, Jr. filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. They seek to annul the CA's decision and resolution, arguing that the CA erred in not nullifying the alias writ of possession. Their main contention is that they are third parties possessing the property adversely to the mortgagor, as evidenced by deeds of sale and their third-party claim. They also argue that the CA misappreciated the evidence, overlooked the pendency of other cases challenging the mortgage and foreclosure, and failed to resolve issues concerning the forcible ejection of Viola Cahilig.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the alias writ of possession despite petitioners' claim as third parties possessing the property adversely to the mortgagor. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the deeds of sale were fictitious and in overlooking the presumption of regularity of notarized documents. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a grave misapprehension of facts and grossly misappreciated evidence in granting the alias writ of possession despite alleged fatal defects in the foreclosure proceedings and the pendency of annulment cases. Whether the Court of Appeals disregarded or failed to resolve the issues raised concerning the forcible ejectment of petitioner Viola Cahilig and the destruction of structures.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the alias writ of possession and the third-party claim: The issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is a ministerial duty of the court after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name, as provided under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. This right to possession becomes absolute, and the court's duty to issue the writ is ministerial, even without a bond, once the redemption period has lapsed and title has been consolidated. While the obligation to issue the writ ceases to be ministerial when a third party is in actual possession claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor, this exception does not apply here. The petitioners' third-party claim was belated and contradicted their prior judicial admissions. In their motion for reconsideration, they opposed the writ based on the pendency of Civil Case No. 6247, wherein they claimed as heirs of Soterania Siñel, not as vendees. This judicial admission, made in the course of proceedings, conclusively binds them. They failed to show that this admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Therefore, they cannot subsequently claim ownership based on alleged prior sales without substantiating their contradictory claim and explaining their failure to present evidence earlier. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the petitioners were not third parties holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. On the validity of the deeds of sale and the presumption of regularity: The subject property is unregistered land, and Section 113 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 applies, requiring instruments affecting unregistered land to be recorded in the Register of Deeds to be valid against third persons. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the deeds of sale in their favor were recorded or annotated on the tax declaration. They also failed to prove that the private respondent or its predecessor-in-interest had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged sale prior to the filing of the third-party claim. Furthermore, the testimony of private respondent's Corporate Secretary, stating that Soterania Siñel was in possession when the mortgage was constituted, was not disputed. Thus, the alleged sale, even if true, does not bind the private respondent as a third party. The presumption of regularity of notarized documents does not overcome the lack of registration and proof of notice to the mortgagee. On the alleged fatal defects in foreclosure proceedings and pendency of other cases: The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a ministerial function and may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself. The Supreme Court has consistently disallowed injunctions to prohibit the issuance of a writ of possession despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's issuance of the writ, as the private respondent acted within its legal rights after the extrajudicial foreclosure and consolidation of title. The alleged defects and pendency of other cases did not divest the court of its ministerial duty to issue the writ. On the alleged forcible ejectment and destruction of structures: The Court of Appeals' decision did not explicitly address the allegations of forcible ejectment and destruction of structures raised in the supplemental petitions. However, the primary issue before the CA was the propriety of the alias writ of possession. The Supreme Court, in affirming the CA's decision, implicitly found that the issuance of the writ was proper, and any actions taken in its implementation, if lawful, would be sustained. The petitioners' failure to establish their status as adverse third-party claimants and their prior judicial admissions weakened their position. The Court noted that the trial court ordered private respondent to post an indemnity bond to answer for damages, which provided a recourse for petitioners if their claims were vindicated in other proceedings.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is a ministerial duty of the court after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name, unless a third party is in actual possession of the property adversely to the judgment debtor. However, a belated third-party claim, inconsistent with prior judicial admissions, will not stay the issuance of the writ.