Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents Albert M. Velasco and Mario I. Molina, employees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), were charged administratively with grave misconduct and placed under preventive suspension for 90 days. The charges stemmed from their alleged participation in a demonstration by GSIS employees protesting alleged corruption and calling for the ouster of the GSIS President and General Manager, Winston F. Garcia. During their preventive suspension and pending administrative cases, respondents were denied their step increment adjustments and employee privileges, citing GSIS Board Resolutions No. 372 and No. 197, which stipulated that employees with pending administrative cases would have their step increments, promotions, performance-based bonuses, and other benefits withheld. Procedural History: Respondents filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. They sought to restrain petitioners, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS and its President and General Manager, from implementing GSIS Board Resolutions No. 197 and No. 372. The respondents argued that the denial of benefits due to pending administrative cases violated their right to be presumed innocent and constituted punishment without a hearing. They also contended that the resolutions were ineffective for not being registered with the UP Law Center. The RTC initially denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction. Subsequently, in a decision dated September 24, 2004, the RTC granted the petition for prohibition, declaring GSIS Board Resolutions No. 197 and No. 372 null and void and making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent. The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in an order dated October 7, 2005. The Petition: Petitioners, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS and Winston F. Garcia, filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the RTC's decision and order. They raised several issues, including whether the Civil Service Commission, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case, and whether the petition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners also argued that the assailed resolutions, being internal regulations, did not require publication with the UP Law Center for their effectivity. Furthermore, they questioned the RTC's declaration that a regulation disqualifying employees with pending administrative cases from receiving benefits was unconstitutional and that the nullification of the resolutions was beyond the scope of a prohibition action. The core of their argument was that the GSIS Board had the authority to issue these resolutions and to disqualify employees with pending administrative cases from receiving benefits.
Issue(s)
Whether the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over the case instead of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Whether the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction. Whether internal rules and regulations need publication with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) for effectivity. Whether a regulation disqualifying government employees with pending administrative cases from step increment and other benefits is unconstitutional. Whether the nullification of GSIS Board Resolutions is beyond an action for prohibition.
Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, declaring the assailed provisions on step increment in GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void. It modified the RTC decision to rule that GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197, 306, and 372 need not be filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Ratio Decidendi
On Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition. A petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is filed when proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The respondents prayed that the trial court declare acts emanating from the resolutions void and prohibit petitioners from enforcing them, which falls within the original jurisdiction of the RTC. The CSC's jurisdiction is generally over administrative cases and personnel actions, but a prohibition case seeking to nullify resolutions and restrain their enforcement is a matter for the courts. On Territorial Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court ruled that the petition was filed in the proper venue. While the GSIS principal office is in Pasay City, Section 21(1) of BP 129 grants RTCs original jurisdiction in issuing writs of prohibition, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. Furthermore, a special civil action for prohibition is a personal action, and venue may be laid where the plaintiff resides. Since respondent Velasco resided in Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila, as sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. On Publication of Resolutions: The Supreme Court clarified that not all rules and regulations adopted by government agencies need to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or permanent character require filing. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of the agency and not the public, need not be filed. The assailed resolutions pertained to internal rules regulating GSIS personnel, thus, their publication or filing with the UP Law Center was not necessary. On Constitutionality of Disqualification and Step Increment: The Supreme Court declared the assailed provisions on step increment in GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void. It reasoned that entitlement to step increment requires continuous satisfactory service. While preventive suspension is not a penalty, it interrupts actual service. However, applying the liberal construction afforded to social legislation and considering that preventive suspension is not a penalty, the Court held that an employee under preventive suspension is still entitled to step increment. The grant of step increment will only be delayed by the number of days of preventive suspension, which must not exceed 90 days. This is akin to the treatment of employees on approved vacation leave without pay. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and denying benefits solely due to a pending administrative case would be unjustified and a violation of due process. On Nullification of Resolutions: The Supreme Court affirmed that a writ of prohibition is a proper remedy to declare acts void and to restrain their enforcement. The trial court correctly declared Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void as they contained provisions that violated the rights of employees, particularly concerning step increments during preventive suspension. The Court clarified that while the RTC declared Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void, it made no ruling on Resolution No. 306, and this matter was not appealed by the respondents, thus limiting the Court's discussion to Nos. 197 and 372.
Main Doctrine
Preventive suspension pending investigation does not interrupt the continuity of service for purposes of step increment; the grant of step increment will only be delayed by the number of days of preventive suspension, not to exceed 90 days, and the employee is entitled to automatic reinstatement if the administrative case is not decided within 90 days.