Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by Spouses Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario against Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. The Del Rosarios claimed ownership of Lot 3-A in Roxas City and alleged that the Foundation took possession of the land in 1991 without their consent or authority, using it for commercial purposes. They asserted that the Foundation's possession was only by tolerance and demanded that it vacate the premises and pay rentals, which the Foundation refused. 2. Procedural History: The Del Rosarios filed their unlawful detainer complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City. The Foundation moved to dismiss, arguing lack of cause of action and forum shopping, asserting it was a lawful lessee of the property from the City of Roxas, which had purchased the land from the Del Rosarios in 1981. The MTCC dismissed the complaint, finding no cause of action. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this dismissal on appeal. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals (CA) also dismissed the Del Rosarios' petition for review, upholding the RTC's decision. A motion for reconsideration filed by the Del Rosarios was denied by the CA. 3. The Petition: The Spouses Del Rosario filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's decision and resolution. They raised two issues: whether a court should limit its interpretation to a single phrase in determining an unlawful detainer case, and whether unlawful detainer exists in this case. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition to be without merit, concluding that the allegations in the Del Rosarios' original complaint established a cause of action for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, and that the action for forcible entry had already prescribed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Review based on the nature of the action and jurisdiction. Whether the cause of action stated in the complaint is for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, considering the allegations of possession without consent, authority, or legal basis. Whether the action for forcible entry, if applicable, has prescribed, and the implications of tolerance as a basis for unlawful detainer. Whether the Court correctly interpreted the complaint as establishing a cause of action for forcible entry, considering the allegations of taking possession without consent and the possibility of strategy or force.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 26, 2005, and its Resolution dated November 15, 2005, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of the action and jurisdiction: The Supreme Court reiterated that the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction. Petitioners' complaint contained judicial admissions, stating that respondent took possession without their consent and authority, and that respondent's use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis. These admissions, as per Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, do not require further proof and are binding upon the pleader. Facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and are conclusive against them. Therefore, the nature of the action is determined by these judicial admissions. On whether the cause of action is for unlawful detainer or forcible entry: The Court distinguished between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Forcible entry involves deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, where possession is illegal from the beginning. Unlawful detainer involves unlawful withholding of possession after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under a contract. Based on petitioners' allegations that respondent took possession without consent, authority, or legal basis, the possession was illegal from the inception. This establishes a cause of action for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, as there was no prior lawful possession that subsequently became unlawful. On the applicability of tolerance and the prescriptive period: The Court clarified that tolerance, as a basis for unlawful detainer, implies that the possession was initially lawful. However, petitioners alleged that respondent's possession was illegal from the start. Therefore, the concept of tolerance, as pleaded by the petitioners, was inconsistent with their claim of illegal possession from inception. Furthermore, the Court noted that petitioners alleged respondent took possession in 1991. An action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time of dispossession. Since the complaint was filed in 2003, the action for forcible entry had already prescribed. Consequently, the complaint failed to state a valid cause of action for either unlawful detainer or forcible entry within the reglementary period. On the Court's interpretation of the complaint: The Court found that the CA correctly determined that the allegations in the complaint, taken as a whole, established a cause of action for forcible entry. The allegations of taking full control and possession without consent and authority, coupled with the assertion that the use was without contractual or legal basis, pointed towards an illegal entry from the beginning. The Court also considered the possibility of strategy or force, as implied by the circumstances described in the complaint, which are elements of forcible entry. The CA's finding that the respondent's entry was by stealth or strategy was based on the petitioners' own allegations.
Main Doctrine
The allegations in the complaint, particularly judicial admissions made by the plaintiff, are determinative of the nature of the action and the court's jurisdiction. A complaint alleging that possession was without consent, authority, or legal basis from the inception establishes a cause of action for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, and is subject to the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry.