People v. Pomar
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The People of the Philippine Islands filed a complaint against Julio Pomar, manager of a tobacco factory, for violating Sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071. The complaint alleged that Pomar failed to pay Macaria Fajardo, a cigar-maker employed by the factory, P80 for 30 days before and 30 days after her confinement on August 12, 1923, despite her entitlement to these wages under the law. Procedural History: The defendant demurred to the complaint, arguing the facts did not constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled. The defendant then answered, admitting the facts but contending that Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. The trial court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Petition: The defendant appealed, assigning as error the overruling of his demurrer, his conviction, and the failure of the court to declare Section 13 of Act No. 3071 unconstitutional.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 13 of Act No. 3071, which compels employers to pay pregnant employees during a mandatory sixty-day vacation period, is a valid exercise of the police power or an unconstitutional violation of the freedom of contract and due process.
Ruling
The Supreme Court revoked the sentence of the lower court, dismissed the complaint, and discharged the defendant. The Court declared Sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 unconstitutional and void.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional and void as it violates the right to liberty and property without due process of law. Relying on the doctrine in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, the Court reasoned that the right to contract about one's affairs is a fundamental part of the liberty of the individual. In the context of employment, both employer and employee possess an equality of right to bargain for the best terms possible. The statute in question arbitrarily creates a term in every contract—the obligation to pay for maternity leave—without the consent of the parties, thereby depriving them of their constitutional freedom to contract. Furthermore, the Court observed that the law compels an employer to pay wages irrespective of the employee's capability to earn or the ability of the business to sustain the burden, effectively shifting a social welfare burden onto a private individual without a casual connection to the work performed. While the Court acknowledged that the police power is a broad authority for the public good, it emphasized that such power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law nor transcend the express inhibitions of the Constitution. Because the law deprived the employer of property for a purpose having no connection to the contract of employment, it failed the constitutional test of a reasonable exercise of police power.
Main Doctrine
A law that infringes upon the liberty of contract, a fundamental right protected by the due process clause, is unconstitutional, even if enacted under the guise of police power, if it lacks a reasonable connection to public health, morals, or safety and arbitrarily imposes obligations on employers.