People v. Concillado

G.R. No. 181204 · 2011-11-28 · J. DEL CASTILLO, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Diosdado Pido was found dead with 26 wounds, including gunshot and stab wounds. Edgar Concillado, Erlito Concillado, and Dolores Concillado were charged with murder. The prosecution presented Lorenzo Viñas, who testified that he saw Edgar shoot Diosdado, and then Edgar and Dolores stab him, followed by Erlito hacking him. The defense presented Edgar, who admitted inflicting the wounds but claimed self-defense, stating Diosdado was the unlawful aggressor. Edgar claimed Diosdado challenged him to a fight and attacked him with a bolo, prompting Edgar to shoot him with a homemade shotgun and then exchange blows. Edgar also claimed his wife Dolores was asleep and his brother Erlito was at a fiesta. Dolores testified she was asleep upstairs and fled when she heard about the killing. Erlito testified he was at a fiesta in another barangay and was warned not to return due to the killing. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found all three accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to death. The Court of Appeals (CA) acquitted Erlito and Dolores, finding Lorenzo's testimony dubious. The CA convicted Edgar of homicide, not murder, for lack of evidence of treachery and evident premeditation, but was not convinced of his self-defense claim. The CA appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Supreme Court reviewed Edgar's appeal. The Petition: Edgar Concillado appealed his conviction.

Issue(s)

Whether Edgar Concillado acted in self-defense. Whether the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were present, thus warranting a conviction for murder. Whether Edgar Concillado is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Whether the damages awarded are proper.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision with modifications. Edgar Concillado was found guilty of homicide, not murder. His claim of self-defense was rejected. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was appreciated. The Court modified the damages, awarding civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages.

Ratio Decidendi

On the claim of self-defense: The Court reiterated the rule that when an accused admits the killing but invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to him. Edgar Concillado failed to discharge this burden. The Court found no unlawful aggression on the part of Diosdado Pido, citing the RTC's finding that the physical arrangement of the scene made it impossible for Diosdado to attack Edgar while he was urinating. Furthermore, the disparity in injuries sustained by the victim (26 wounds) and the accused (three superficial wounds) belied the claim of self-defense. The Court also noted Edgar's admission that he continued to inflict injuries even when the victim was already on the ground. Therefore, Edgar's theory of self-defense had no basis. On the conviction for murder (treachery and evident premeditation): The Court agreed with the CA that Edgar could only be held liable for homicide, not murder. The CA had discredited the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Lorenzo Viñas. Without Lorenzo's testimony, the prosecution lacked evidence to establish how the attack commenced or was perpetrated. There was also no evidence showing that Edgar decided to kill Diosdado and clung to that determination with sufficient time for reflection. Consequently, the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation could not be appreciated. On the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the penalty: The Court found that Edgar's surrender was spontaneous and unconditional. He presented himself to the police before they knew of the killing and admitted to having killed Diosdado. The Court gave more weight to the police blotter entry indicating surrender on August 24, 2002, over the testimony of SPO1 Lesiguez, deeming it improbable for Edgar to surrender before committing the crime. Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated. For homicide, the penalty is reclusion temporal. With the presence of the sole mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty was imposed in its minimum period, ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty was taken from the next lower penalty, prision mayor (six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years). Thus, Edgar was sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. On the damages: The Court affirmed the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00. It found that the CA erred in deleting the award of moral damages, which are mandatory in homicide cases, and thus awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Since actual damages were not substantiated by receipts, the Court awarded ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu thereof. All monetary awards were ordered to bear legal interest at 6% from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid.

Main Doctrine

When an accused admits the commission of the crime but claims the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. When the accused fails to discharge this burden, his conviction must be sustained.

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