Salting v. Velez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents John and Clarissa Velez filed an ejectment case against petitioner Milagros Salting for a property covered by TCT No. 38079. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering petitioner to vacate the property. This decision became final and executory. Procedural History: Petitioner filed an action for Annulment of Sale of the property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming she purchased the property from the Heirs of Villamena and that respondents obtained title through fraudulent acts. She also alleged improper service of the MeTC decision as her counsel had died. The RTC granted a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the RTC's order, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the injunction, as petitioner had no clear right to possession given the final and executory MeTC decision. The Petition: Petitioner sought review of the CA decision, arguing that the CA disregarded the rule on invalid service of judgment to a deceased lawyer and that she had a clear right to possession that should be protected by injunction.
Issue(s)
Whether the MeTC decision became final and executory despite service on petitioner's deceased counsel. Whether the pendency of an action assailing the right of a party to eject will justify the suspension of proceedings in an ejectment case. Whether petitioner was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the MeTC decision.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the MeTC decision became final and executory despite service on petitioner's deceased counsel: The Court held that service of judgment upon a party's counsel is valid and binding upon the party, even if the counsel has died. It is the duty of the party-litigant to be in contact with their counsel and to inform the court of the death of their counsel. Failure to do so constitutes negligence, and the party cannot shift the blame to the court. The Court noted that petitioner instituted an action for annulment of sale instead of an action for annulment of judgment, indicating a separation of the two cases. Therefore, the MeTC decision had indeed become final and executory. On whether the pendency of an action assailing the right of a party to eject will justify the suspension of proceedings in an ejectment case: The Court reiterated the settled rule that suits involving ownership do not abate the enforcement of a final decision in an ejectment suit. The rationale is to prevent ejectment cases from being frustrated by the mere filing of an ownership action, thereby upholding the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and preventing breaches of peace. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily restore possession, without prejudice to the settlement of ownership claims in appropriate proceedings. The finality of the ejectment decision regarding possession de facto cannot be affected by the pendency of an annulment case concerning ownership. On whether petitioner was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the MeTC decision: The Court affirmed the CA's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction. To be entitled to such a writ, the applicant must show a clear and unmistakable right that is directly threatened. In this case, petitioner's right to possess the property was declared inferior or inexistent in the final and executory MeTC decision. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. Furthermore, the Court noted that the MeTC decision had already been executed, rendering the issue of injunction moot.
Main Doctrine
A final and executory decision in an ejectment case cannot be enjoined by a preliminary injunction in a separate action for annulment of sale, as the summary remedy of ejectment is designed to restore possession without prejudice to the settlement of ownership claims in appropriate proceedings. Furthermore, service of judgment upon a party's counsel is valid and binding even if the counsel has died, provided the party-litigant has not informed the court of such death.