People v. Soledad
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Rochelle Bagaporo, a credit card agent, offered private complainant Henry C. Yu a loan assistance. Yu invited Bagaporo to his office, where she indorsed him to her boss, petitioner Mark Soledad. Soledad instructed Yu to submit documents to Ronald Gobenchiong. Yu submitted his Globe handyphone platinum gold card, IDs, and statements of account. Yu later failed to contact Soledad or Gobenchiong. Yu received his Globe statement of account showing charges for two mobile numbers not his. Verification revealed five additional mobile numbers in his name, with applications bearing Soledad's picture and forged signature. Yu also discovered altered Citibank credit card information and a Metrobank credit card application. Procedural History: Yu and a Metrobank junior assistant manager lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). An entrapment operation was conducted where NBI Special Investigator Salvador Arteche posed as a delivery boy for a Metrobank credit card. Petitioner Soledad, claiming to be Henry Yu, presented two identification cards bearing Yu's name and forged signature, but Soledad's picture. Soledad signed the delivery receipt. Arteche then identified himself as an NBI operative and apprehended Soledad, recovering the identification cards. Petitioner was charged with Violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, for possessing a counterfeit access device or an access device fraudulently applied for. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction with modification. The Petition: Petitioner sought review of the CA decision, raising issues on the validity of the Information, whether it charged the offense for which he was found guilty, whether he was sufficiently informed of the accusations, and whether he was in legal "possession" of the credit card.
Issue(s)
Whether the Information is valid and whether it charges the offense for which the petitioner was found guilty. Whether the petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him. Whether the petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject of the case.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603 are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the Information and whether it charges the offense for which the petitioner was found guilty: The Court held that the Information was sufficient. Citing Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court stated that an information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the place of commission. In this case, the Information clearly identified the accused, specified the charge as Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e), and narrated the acts constituting the offense, including defrauding the complainant by applying for a credit card using his name and fraudulently obtained documents, and the successful issuance and delivery of the credit card to the accused using a fictitious identity. Although the word "possession" was not explicitly in the accusatory portion, it appeared in the preamble of the Information, and the acts described clearly constituted possession of a fraudulently applied for access device. The Court emphasized that the preamble and the accusatory paragraph should be considered together as a whole document. On whether the petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him: The Court found that the petitioner was sufficiently informed. The Information contained all the necessary details of the offense committed, including the specific law violated, the acts constituting the offense, the offended party, and the place and approximate date of commission. The preamble stating "possessing" and the accusatory portion detailing the fraudulent application, issuance, and delivery of the credit card to the accused using a fictitious identity, provided adequate notice of the charges. The Court reiterated that the Information, when read as a whole, fulfilled the constitutional requirement of notice. On whether the petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject of the case: The Court ruled that the petitioner was in legal possession. The law does not define "possession," so the Court referred to Article 523 of the Civil Code, defining possession as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, requiring both the corpus (material holding) and animus possidendi (intent to possess). The Court found that the petitioner demonstrated both elements. His prior actions, such as fraudulently obtaining documents and applying for the credit card, showed intent. During the entrapment, he materially held the envelope containing the credit card, presented forged identification cards to receive it, and signed the acknowledgment receipt, indicating delivery and transfer of possession. His active participation in acquiring the envelope and signing the receipt, coupled with his prior fraudulent acts, established his intent to possess the credit card.
Main Doctrine
Possession of a fraudulently applied for access device, under R.A. No. 8484, includes not only physical holding but also the intent to possess, which can be inferred from the accused's actions and the surrounding circumstances, such as actively participating in the acquisition and signing an acknowledgment receipt.