Fernando v. Fernando
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Spouses Ireneo and Monserrat Fernando (petitioners), Juliana T. Fernando, and Celerina T. Fernando were co-owners of three parcels of land. Celerina died in 1988, and Juliana died in 1998. On November 3, 1994, Ireneo and Juliana presented a Deed of Partition with Sale dated October 27, 1994, allegedly executed by all co-owners, partitioning the properties and allotting Lot No. 22 to petitioners, Lot No. 24 to Juliana, and Lot No. 26 to Celerina. Juliana also agreed to sell Lot No. 24 to petitioners for ₱300,000.00. New Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued accordingly. Respondent Marcelino T. Fernando, brother of Ireneo, Juliana, and Celerina, annotated an adverse claim on the TCTs, asserting his right as an heir of Celerina. Procedural History: Respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the deed and derivative TCTs, alleging forgery of Celerina's signature (as she was already deceased when the deed was purportedly executed) and simulation of the sale of Lot No. 24 due to lack of consideration. Intervenors, administrators of Juliana's estate, echoed the claim of a fictitious sale. Petitioners asserted the deed was executed in 1986 and belatedly notarized in 1994. The RTC dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. The Court of Appeals reversed, declaring the deed and TCTs void due to Celerina's forged signature and ordering the revival of the original TCTs. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioners contend that the appellate court disregarded the trial court's findings on the signature's authenticity, failed to consider their explanation regarding the execution date, and erred in upholding respondent's legal personality to question the deed. They argue that the deed, even if notarized late, is valid and binding, and that a notarial defect does not invalidate it.
Issue(s)
Whether the Deed of Partition with Sale dated October 27, 1994, is valid and genuine. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's decision and declaring the deed and derivative TCTs void. Whether respondent has the legal personality to question the validity of the deed. Whether the notarization defect renders the deed void ab initio.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, declaring the Deed of Partition with Sale dated October 27, 1994, and the derivative TCTs void. The Register of Deeds is directed to revive the original TCTs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity and genuineness of the Deed of Partition with Sale: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that the Deed of Partition with Sale is void ab initio. The Court noted that Celerina T. Fernando died on April 28, 1988, but the deed was purportedly executed and notarized on October 27, 1994. This fact alone renders the deed a nullity, as a deceased person cannot affix her signature or appear before a notary public. The Court found the petitioners' explanation that the deed was executed in 1986 and merely notarized later unconvincing, especially given the inconsistencies in the typeset of the document and the fact that the "Series of 1994" was clearly indicated. The Court also observed similarities in the handwriting of the "Fernando" surname on the signatures of Juliana and Celerina, raising further doubts about their genuineness. The testimony of Monserrat Fernando, the sole witness for the petitioners, was found insufficient to corroborate their claims, as she could not recall crucial details such as the witnesses to the deed or the circumstances surrounding its safekeeping and notarization. The failure to present the notary public further weakened the petitioners' case. The Court reiterated that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title, and an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. On the Court of Appeals' reversal of the RTC's decision: The Supreme Court found no error in the appellate court's reversal of the RTC's decision. The RTC's ruling that the deed was valid despite the notarization defect was based on an insufficient appreciation of the facts, particularly the glaring discrepancy between Celerina's death and the purported execution date of the deed. The appellate court correctly identified the forgery as a fundamental flaw that rendered the deed void from the beginning. The Court emphasized that while the RTC mentioned no dispute as to the genuineness of the signatures, its conclusion was not supported by adequate legal or factual basis. The Supreme Court's role as a trier of facts is justified when the factual findings of the lower courts are conflicting, as in this case. On respondent's legal personality to question the deed: The Court implicitly upheld respondent's legal personality to question the deed. While the RTC opined that respondent and intervenors were not compulsory heirs and thus could not assail the sale, the Supreme Court's affirmation of the appellate court's decision, which declared the deed void, effectively validates the respondent's action. The respondent, as an heir of Celerina, has a direct interest in the properties and the validity of transactions affecting them. Furthermore, the principle that a void contract can be attacked by anyone with an interest in the matter, especially when it concerns the integrity of titles under the Torrens system, supports the respondent's standing. On the effect of notarization defect: The Court clarified that the issue was not merely a notarization defect but a fundamental forgery, as one of the purported signatories was already deceased. The Court reiterated that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. The fact that the deed was notarized on a later date, or that the notary public might have committed an offense, is secondary to the primary issue of forgery. The Court stated that whether the notary public was responsible for inserting the date of execution is immaterial because the deed itself is void due to the forged signature of Celerina. The Court's ruling in Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban was cited, emphasizing that a forged deed is a nullity and that an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. Registration under the Torrens system does not vest title; it merely serves as evidence of title, and it cannot validate a void deed.
Main Doctrine
A deed of partition with sale is void ab initio if it bears the forged signature of a deceased co-owner, as such a document conveys no title and can be attacked anytime. Registration under the Torrens system does not validate a void deed.