Felismino v. Gloria
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a foreclosure of mortgage case (Civil Case No. 1618) in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. The judgment, rendered on January 9, 1924, favored the plaintiff, Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co., Ltd., against the defendants Ramon Ramos, his wife Pilar Ibañez, Bernardo Marquez, and Arego Hermanos y Cia. The judgment ordered the payment of the debt within three months, failing which the mortgaged properties were to be sold at public auction. The petitioners, Castor Felismino et al., were planters who had entered into written contracts with the mortgagors, asserting rights to permanent improvements on the mortgaged land, including coconut trees, which they claimed should be paid for or transferred to them. 2. Procedural History: The judgment in the foreclosure case became final as no appeal was filed. The petitioners claim they only learned of this decision on April 7, 1924. Subsequently, on April 19, 1924, they filed two petitions with the Court of First Instance of Tayabas: one for intervention under section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure and another for the annulment of the judgment under section 113 of the same Code. The trial court denied both petitions and ordered the execution of the judgment, leading to the sheriff announcing a public auction of the mortgaged properties for May 21, 1924. The petitioners then brought their case to the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed an action for mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking an injunction against the respondent judge and sheriff, the annulment of the foreclosure judgment, permission to intervene in the original case, and indemnity for damages. The respondents demurred to the petition, arguing it failed to state a cause of action and had a defect of parties. The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer, finding that the relief under section 113 is discretionary and cannot be compelled by mandamus, and that the petition for intervention was filed too late, as the trial period had concluded with the rendition of a final judgment. The petitioners subsequently waived their right to amend the petition, leading to its dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for mandamus states a sufficient cause of action. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to annul the judgment under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the petitioners should be allowed to intervene in civil case No. 1618.
Ruling
The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer to the petition for mandamus, dismissing the case. The petitioners had waived their right to amend their petition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the refusal to annul the judgment under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure: The relief provided under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a matter of strict right but is purely discretionary on the part of the court. Mandamus cannot be used to compel a trial court to exercise its discretion in a particular way. Therefore, the refusal to grant this discretionary relief cannot be a ground for mandamus. The court correctly exercised its discretion in denying the petition for annulment. On the denial of the petition for intervention: The petition for intervention was filed after the judgment in civil case No. 1618 had become final. Intervention is generally allowed only during the pendency of the action, specifically "during the trial" or "during the pendency of the action." The English text of section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure clarifies this by stating "during the trial," which terminates when the judgment is rendered. Allowing intervention after a final judgment would disrupt the finality of judicial decisions and is therefore not permissible. The trial court acted within its rights in denying such a late petition for intervention. Consequently, mandamus cannot compel the granting of a petition for intervention that is untimely and lacks sufficient grounds. On whether the petition states a cause of action: Since the relief sought by the petitioners was either discretionary and properly denied, or sought to intervene in a case with a final judgment, the allegations in the petition for mandamus did not constitute a sufficient cause of action. The demurrer to the petition was therefore correctly sustained.
Main Doctrine
A petition for mandamus will not lie to compel a trial court to grant relief that is purely discretionary, nor will it lie to compel intervention in a case already decided by a final judgment, as such intervention would be considered late.