Gutierrez v. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 193459 · 2011-03-08 · J. CARPIO MORALES, J.: · Primary: Political; Secondary: Ethics
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez. The core issue revolves around the interpretation of the constitutional provision stating that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The petitioner argued that the one-year bar should be reckoned from the mere filing of an impeachment complaint, while the respondents contended that it should be counted from the referral of the complaint to the House Committee on Justice. Procedural History: The case reached the Supreme Court following the filing of an impeachment complaint against the Ombudsman. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice initiated proceedings, leading to the petitioner's argument that a second impeachment proceeding was being initiated within the one-year bar period. The Supreme Court initially issued a Status Quo Ante Order, which was later lifted by a Resolution dated February 15, 2011. The present document is a Resolution denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the February 15, 2011 Resolution. The Petition: The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Supreme Court's February 15, 2011 Resolution deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives. Specifically, she contended that the one-year bar should be counted from the filing of the impeachment complaint, not its referral to the Committee on Justice. She also raised arguments regarding the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules and alleged bias by the Committee Chairperson. The Supreme Court, in denying the motion, reaffirmed its interpretation that the initiation of impeachment proceedings requires both filing and referral, consistent with the Francisco doctrine, and found no merit in the petitioner's other arguments.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court's February 15, 2011 Decision deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives regarding the initiation of impeachment proceedings and the application of the one-year bar rule. Whether promulgation of the Impeachment Rules requires publication in the Official Gazette. Whether the House of Representatives has discretion in the referral of impeachment complaints. Whether the actions of the Committee Chairperson and the Committee members demonstrated bias and vindictiveness.

Ruling

The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. It affirmed its February 15, 2011 Decision, holding that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is reckoned from the filing and referral of the complaint, consistent with Francisco. The Court also maintained that promulgation does not require publication and that the House has discretion in its internal rules and procedures, subject to constitutional limitations. The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order was deemed effective immediately.

Ratio Decidendi

On the deviation from Francisco and the one-year bar rule: The Court clarified that its February 15, 2011 Decision did not deviate from Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives but rather reaffirmed and illuminated its doctrine. The Court explained that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding, for the purpose of the one-year bar rule, is completed by the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner's argument that referral is not an integral part of initiation was addressed by noting that in the abbreviated mode of initiation, filing and initial action are merged. The Court emphasized that the one-year bar rule is a constitutional limitation on the House's power to refer a complaint, and referring a complaint within an existing one-year bar would constitute a constitutionally prohibited act, potentially subject to review for grave abuse of discretion. The Court found petitioner's arguments regarding the singular tense of 'complaint' and the potential for abuse to be tenuous or already addressed by the constitutional framework. On the promulgation of Impeachment Rules: The Court reiterated its stance that the word "promulgate" in the Constitution does not necessarily mean publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation means "to make known," and the House of Representatives has discretion on how to effectively make its Impeachment Rules known. The Court distinguished this from rules of procedure for inquiries in aid of legislation, which the Constitution explicitly requires to be published. The Court also clarified that requiring publication of the Impeachment Rules would indeed delay proceedings and potentially cause the House to violate constitutionally mandated periods, especially when impeachment complaints are filed at the start of a Congress. The self-executing provisions of the Constitution must be observed regardless of the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules. On the discretion of the House in referral: The Court affirmed that the House has a conscious role in the initiation of impeachment proceedings, and the referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is a power granted by the Constitution. The House cannot refuse to refer a complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. However, referring a complaint within an existing one-year bar would be an unconstitutional act. The House's duty is to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without regard to the merits of the complaint. The Court stressed that the pacing of impeachment proceedings, beyond constitutionally mandated periods, is within the House's discretion as a co-equal branch of government. On allegations of bias and vindictiveness: The Court found that the alleged actuations of the Committee Chairperson were part of his duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, the actions taken by the Committee were collective undertakings of its members, validated by their votes. The Court reiterated that impeachment is a political exercise, not a judicial proceeding, and thus petitioner cannot demand the same standards of inhibition as in judicial cases. The Impeachment Rules do not provide for inhibition of committee members, and any decision on partiality must be respected by the Court, which is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch.

Main Doctrine

The Court reiterated that the initiation of impeachment proceedings, for the purpose of the one-year bar rule, is reckoned from the filing of the impeachment complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice, consistent with the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives. The Court also affirmed that promulgation of the Impeachment Rules does not necessitate publication in the Official Gazette, and the House of Representatives has discretion on how to make its rules known.

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