Cayetano v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections, petitioner Maria Laarni L. Cayetano and private respondent Dante O. Tinga were candidates for Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner with 95,865 votes against private respondent's 93,445 votes. Procedural History: On May 24, 2010, private respondent filed an Election Protest before the COMELEC, alleging frauds and irregularities. Petitioner filed an Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the protest. On August 23, 2010, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued a Preliminary Conference Order finding the protest and counter-protest sufficient in form and substance, effectively denying petitioner's affirmative defense and directing cash deposits for recount expenses. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the COMELEC on September 7, 2010. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the COMELEC Orders dated August 23, 2010, and September 7, 2010, arguing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest for insufficiency in form and content.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court has the power to review via certiorari the interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the election protest for insufficiency in form and content.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC, except in cases of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or when the order is a patent nullity. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Supreme Court's power to review COMELEC Division orders: The Court reiterated the principle established in Repol v. COMELEC, as affirmed in Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC and Blanco v. COMELEC, that it has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). This is based on Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which prescribes that only decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Court emphasized that failure to abide by the procedural requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc for final decisions, or seeking resolution from the division itself for interlocutory matters, constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. The Court clarified that this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when the issuance of the interlocutory order is a patent nullity due to absence of jurisdiction, or when there is a miscarriage of justice, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy. However, the Court found that the assailed orders in this case, which involved the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, did not fall under these exceptions. The Court stressed that to rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court's docket and unduly burden the Court. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no merit in petitioner's assertion that the circumstances in this case differed from Repol. The Court reiterated that the general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner could not be questioned before the Supreme Court even via a petition for certiorari. The Court noted that the exception to the rule, where an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same, was not present in this case. The assailed orders involved the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and not a situation where the COMELEC Division acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Therefore, certiorari would not lie. The Court advised that the aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if, in the course of the proceedings, they decide to appeal the main case to the COMELEC en banc. The protest and counter-protest remained pending before the COMELEC, affording petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), except when the commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face or the order is a patent nullity.