Rayos v. City of Manila
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The City of Manila initiated an eminent domain case to acquire a parcel of land co-owned by several defendants, offering to purchase it at ₱1,000.00 per square meter. The defendants expressed willingness to sell but demanded a price of ₱50,000.00 per square meter, claiming it was the fair market value. During the proceedings, one defendant died and was substituted by petitioner Manuel A. Rayos. Petitioners Orlando A. Rayos and Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz later intervened or were added as parties to the case. 2. Procedural History: The City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 03108154. Petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the City's Ordinance No. 7949 was unconstitutional and that prior Supreme Court cases (Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila) were squarely applicable. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, denied this motion on March 11, 2010, finding no compelling reason to apply the cited precedents. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied on January 6, 2011. 3. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition with the Supreme Court, captioned as a petition for review on certiorari and declaratory relief, assailing the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. They reiterated their arguments that Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional and that the Lagcao and Jesus Is Lord cases should govern. The Supreme Court, however, found that the petition was filed under the wrong remedy (Rule 45 instead of Rule 65 for an interlocutory order) and, even if treated as a Rule 65 petition, violated the hierarchy of courts by not being filed first with the Court of Appeals, without sufficient justification for direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail an order denying a motion to dismiss. Whether the Supreme Court can directly entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, bypassing the Court of Appeals, in the absence of special and important reasons. Whether Ordinance No. 7949 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, and whether the cases of Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila are squarely applicable to the present case. Assuming the petition was also for declaratory relief, whether the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over such petitions, and whether exceptional circumstances exist to treat it as one for prohibition or mandamus.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, it must be dismissed for violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, as it should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only with special and important reasons, which were not sufficiently established by the petitioners. The Court also noted that the petition for declaratory relief, as indicated in its caption, falls under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not its original jurisdiction, and there were no far-reaching implications or transcendental issues to warrant treating it as a petition for prohibition or mandamus.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy: The Court reiterated that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature because it does not finally dispose of the case. Consequently, it is not appealable under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly states that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. The aggrieved party's immediate recourse is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was the wrong remedy, warranting the outright dismissal of the petition. On the violation of the hierarchy of courts and the lack of special and important reasons for direct recourse: Even if the Court were to treat the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it would still be dismissed due to the violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari. However, this concurrence does not grant parties an unrestrained freedom to choose their forum. The established policy dictates that petitions against first-level courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter with the Court of Appeals. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is permissible only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition, to prevent undue demands on the Court's time and to avoid overcrowding its docket. The petitioners failed to demonstrate any exceptional or compelling reasons that would justify their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. They merely rehashed the arguments from their motion to dismiss, which were characterized as unsubstantiated allegations. On the challenge to the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7949: Specifically, their invocation of Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila in challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7949 lacked a clear showing of applicability and similarity to the present controversy. Furthermore, they did not adequately explain why Ordinance No. 7949 was unconstitutional, nor did they set forth any extraordinary and important reason for bypassing the Court of Appeals. On the petition for declaratory relief: Assuming the petition was also for declaratory relief, as suggested by its caption, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over such petitions is appellate, not original. While the Court may, in exceptional cases with far-reaching implications and transcendental issues, treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which it exercises original jurisdiction, no such circumstances were present in this case. The petition lacked any indication of far-reaching implications or transcendental questions that would warrant such special treatment.
Main Doctrine
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 45; the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari is permissible only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition, to justify bypassing the Court of Appeals.