Nerwin Industries Corporation v. Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation

G.R. No. 167057 · 2012-04-11 · J. BERSAMIN, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Administrative Law, Government Contracts
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) initiated a bidding process (IPB No. 80) for the supply of woodpoles and crossarms for its Rural Electrification Project. Nerwin Industries Corporation (Nerwin) emerged as the lowest bidder. However, NEA's Board of Directors later reduced the material requirements by 50% and awarded the reduced contract to Nerwin. Losing bidders protested, alleging false documents. Subsequently, NEA officials sought to nullify the award, despite favorable opinions from the Government Corporate Counsel regarding Nerwin's eligibility. Nerwin then filed a complaint for specific performance with an injunction, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 2. Procedural History: Nerwin filed a civil action against PNOC-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) and its Bids and Awards Committee Chairman, alleging that a new requisition (Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1) for wooden poles for the O-ILAW project was an attempt to re-bid items covered by IPB No. 80. Nerwin sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin the proposed bidding. The RTC granted a TRO on June 27, 2003. Subsequently, on July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order denying a motion to consolidate, denying a motion for reconsideration, disqualifying respondents' counsel, declaring respondents in default, and granting a writ of preliminary injunction upon Nerwin's posting of a P200,000.00 bond. The RTC denied respondents' subsequent motions for reconsideration and to set aside the order of default on January 13, 2004. PNOC-EDC filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the injunction despite the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975. On October 22, 2004, the CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC's orders, and dismissed Nerwin's complaint. The CA denied Nerwin's motion for reconsideration on February 9, 2005. 3. The Petition: Nerwin Industries Corporation filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising three issues: (1) whether the CA erred in dismissing the case based on Republic Act No. 8975, which prohibits lower courts from issuing TROs and preliminary injunctions on government projects; (2) whether the CA erred in dismissing the entire case based on RA 8975, which prohibits preliminary injunctions but not injunctions as a final remedy; and (3) whether the CA erred in dismissing the case despite it also being for damages. Nerwin argued that the CA should not have dismissed the case solely on the basis of RA 8975, which it contended was misapplied, and that the case involved more than just the issuance of an injunction.

Issue(s)

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and preliminary injunction, which were void and of no force and effect under Republic Act No. 8975. Consequently, the dismissal of Nerwin's complaint was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

On the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975: The Court reiterated that Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions, or preliminary mandatory injunctions against the government or its officials concerning government projects, including the bidding or awarding of contracts. Section 3 of RA 8975 explicitly lists acts that cannot be restrained, such as the bidding or awarding of contracts of the national government. The O-ILAW project, being a rural electrification project, falls within the purview of government infrastructure projects. The RTC's issuance of the TRO and preliminary injunction was a palpable violation of this statutory prohibition, as it entertained an application and issued writs that it was legally barred from issuing. The prohibition applies to all cases instituted by a private party, including bidders, unless the matter involves extreme urgency and a constitutional issue that would result in grave injustice and irreparable injury, which was not demonstrated in this case. The Court emphasized that the prohibition under RA 8975 supersedes PD 1818 and has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court. On the scope of the prohibition and the dismissal of the entire case: The Court clarified that the prohibition under RA 8975 applies to the issuance of TROs and preliminary injunctions, and any writ issued in violation thereof is void. The RTC should not have given due course to Nerwin's complaint for injunction in the first place, as it contravened the express provisions of RA 8975. Therefore, the subsequent orders, including the declaration of default and disqualification of counsel, were rendered without jurisdiction. While the case might have included a prayer for damages, the primary relief sought and granted by the RTC was injunctive relief against a government project, which was statutorily prohibited. The CA correctly dismissed the entire case because the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in entertaining the injunctive aspect of the complaint, rendering its subsequent actions void. The Court stressed that a preliminary injunction is a preventive remedy and not a final determination of the merits of a case, and it should not be used to prevent an act prohibited by statute. On the RTC's actions and grave abuse of discretion: The Court found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in entertaining Nerwin's complaint and issuing the TRO and preliminary injunction, thereby violating RA 8975. This disregard of a clear and unequivocal mandate constitutes grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, as previously established in administrative cases against judges who issued similar writs against government infrastructure projects. The Court noted that the Presiding Judge of the RTC branch involved was previously found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for issuing the assailed orders. The Court reiterated that judges are expected to be acquainted with statutes and circulars, and a blatant disregard of the law obviates the presumption of regularity and good faith, rendering them susceptible to administrative sanctions. The RTC's actions were not justified by any exception provided in RA 8975, and it failed to show that the case involved extreme urgency and a constitutional issue leading to grave injustice and irreparable injury.

Main Doctrine

Courts, except the Supreme Court, are expressly prohibited by Republic Act No. 8975 from issuing temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, or preliminary mandatory injunctions against the government or its officials concerning government projects, including the bidding or awarding of contracts. Any such writ issued in violation of this prohibition is void and of no force and effect.

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