Cabaluna v. Ventura
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Ricardo Cabaluna, the chief of police of Iloilo, was suspended from his office due to a prosecution for alleged unfaithfulness in office. Although convicted in the Court of First Instance, he was acquitted upon appeal to the Supreme Court. Following his acquittal, the provincial governor issued an order reinstating him and entitling him to his salary during the period of suspension, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 2. Procedural History: After the provincial governor's reinstatement order was forwarded through the Chief of the Executive Bureau, it was returned disapproved by the Secretary of the Interior. The disapproval was based on the Attorney-General's opinion that a chief of police is not a municipal officer under Section 2192 of the Administrative Code, thus precluding payment of salary during suspension. This led to the filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus. 3. The Petition: The petitioner, Ricardo Cabaluna, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Honorio Ventura, Chief of the Executive Bureau, and the Honorable Felipe Agoncillo, Secretary of the Interior, to order the payment of his withheld salary. The petition raises two main questions: whether a chief of police is a municipal officer within the meaning of Section 2192 of the Administrative Code, and if so, whether the Secretary of the Interior can be compelled to approve the payment of the salary.
Issue(s)
Whether a chief of police is a municipal officer within the meaning of section 2192 of the Administrative Code. Whether the respondent Secretary of the Interior can be constrained to reverse his action and approve the executive order authorizing the payment of the petitioner's withheld salary.
Ruling
The demurrer is sustained, and the petition is dismissed without costs. The Supreme Court held that while a chief of police is a municipal officer and the Secretary of the Interior has discretion to order payment of withheld salary, the court cannot compel the Secretary to exercise this discretion.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a chief of police is a municipal officer within the meaning of section 2192 of the Administrative Code: The Court unequivocally declared that a chief of police is indeed a municipal officer under the said section. The Court reasoned that while Section 2169 enumerates certain chief officials, it does not claim to be exhaustive. Furthermore, the definition of "officer" in Section 2 of the Administrative Code, referring to those whose duties involve the exercise of discretion, clearly applies to a chief of police. The Court cited the appointment process, salary source, susceptibility to suspension and removal, and administrative discipline as evidence of the chief of police's status as a municipal officer. The fact that a chief of police is also a peace officer subject to Constabulary regulations does not negate his municipal officer status. On the issue of whether the respondent Secretary of the Interior can be constrained to reverse his action and approve the executive order authorizing the payment of the petitioner's withheld salary: The Court held that it cannot compel the Secretary of the Interior to approve the payment. The Court emphasized that Section 2192 of the Administrative Code uses the permissive term "may order," indicating discretion vested in the Department Head, not a mandatory obligation. Therefore, the Secretary's action, even if based on an erroneous assumption of law, cannot be overridden by a writ of mandamus because the law grants him the discretion to decide whether to order the payment of the whole or part of the salary. The Court stated that it will not interfere with the administrative officer's exercise of official discretion, especially since there might be other unstated reasons justifying the withholding of the salary.
Main Doctrine
A Chief of Police is considered a municipal officer within the meaning of Section 2192 of the Administrative Code, and the Department Head has discretion to order the payment of salary withheld during suspension, but this court cannot compel the exercise of such discretion.