Kulayan v. Tan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On January 15, 2009, three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) members were kidnapped in Sulu by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The incident prompted the creation of a local crisis committee, led by Governor Abdusakur M. Tan, to manage the situation. Governor Tan subsequently organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed civilians, through a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). This memorandum outlined the responsibilities of each party in the rescue operation. Procedural History: Following the kidnapping, a state of emergency was declared in Sulu by Governor Tan through Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, citing the ASG's actions and invoking provisions of the Local Government Code. This proclamation authorized the PNP and CEF to set up checkpoints, conduct searches and seizures, and make arrests. Subsequently, several individuals, including petitioners Jamar M. Kulayan, Temen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, were arrested under this proclamation. The petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court. The Petition: The petitioners argue that Governor Tan's Proclamation No. 1 and its implementing guidelines were issued ultra vires and with grave abuse of discretion, violating fundamental constitutional rights. They contend that only the President possesses the calling-out powers and the authority to declare a state of emergency, not a provincial governor. The petitioners also assert that the Local Government Code does not grant the governor the power to convene a civilian armed force like the CEF or to authorize general searches and seizures. They seek to have the proclamation and its guidelines declared null and void.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the petition despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Whether the Provincial Governor of Sulu is vested with the authority to declare a state of emergency and exercise the powers enumerated in Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, including the conduct of general searches and seizures and the convening of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF). Whether Section 465 of the Local Government Code can be invoked to justify the powers exercised by the Provincial Governor under Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and whether the Provincial Governor had the authority to convene the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF).
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents were commanded to desist from further proceedings in implementing the said proclamation and guidelines.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts: The Court held that while the doctrine of hierarchy of courts generally requires cases to be filed in lower courts first, it is not absolute. In cases involving constitutional questions of transcendental public importance, especially those concerning restrictive custody and the diminution of basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency, the Supreme Court may take primary jurisdiction. The Court cited Chavez v. PEA-Amari and David v. Macapagal-Arroyo to support the relaxation of this rule, emphasizing that emergency proclamations are short-lived and require prompt resolution to guide the bench, bar, and public. The present case, involving fundamental freedoms and the actions of public officials, warrants such relaxation. On the Provincial Governor's Authority to Declare a State of Emergency and Exercise Calling-Out Powers: The Court ruled that the power to declare a state of emergency and exercise 'calling-out' powers is exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This power is derived from Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution. The Court reiterated the principle of a single executive, established in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, emphasizing that executive powers, particularly those of exceptional import like calling out the armed forces, can only be exercised by the President. The Court distinguished this from the President's power to declare martial law, which is subject to Congressional revocation and judicial review, noting that the calling-out power is considered a lesser and more benign power, granting the President full discretion. The Court explicitly stated that a provincial governor is not endowed with such powers and any exercise thereof is ultra vires. On the Applicability of Section 465 of the Local Government Code and the Authority to Convene the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF): The Court found that Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers exercised by the Provincial Governor. Paragraph (b)(1)(vii) of Section 465, which allows for emergency measures during calamities and disasters, was deemed inapplicable because the kidnapping incident, while serious, was not a 'calamity or disaster' in the context contemplated by the law. Furthermore, Paragraph (b)(2)(vi), which allows calling upon national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, was found inapplicable for two reasons: first, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is not a 'national law enforcement agency' but a military force with a different mandate; and second, there was no evidence presented to show that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation. The Court stressed that the Local Government Code does not diminish central powers vested in the National Government, especially those constitutionally granted to the President. The Court also declared the creation of the CEF by the Provincial Governor as invalid. This is based on the constitutional mandate to establish one national police force and the proscription against private armies and unauthorized armed groups under Article XVIII, Section 24 of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were wary of armed citizens' groups operating under the cloak of legality, as evidenced by discussions concerning the dismantling of paramilitary forces. The Court concluded that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed groups like the CEF, and such actions by a local executive are beyond their legal authority.
Main Doctrine
A provincial governor does not possess the 'calling-out' powers, which are exclusive to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Proclamations issued by local executives exercising such powers, or powers akin to martial law, are ultra vires and void for grave abuse of discretion.