Fernando v. St. Scholastica's College
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents St. Scholastica's College (SSC) and St. Scholastica's Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions. Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994, later amended by Ordinances No. 217 and 200, which regulated the construction of fences and walls. Specifically, the ordinance mandated that front yard fences not exceed one meter in height, or if taller, be at least 80% see-thru. It also required a five-meter setback for fences and walls from the front property line for commercial, industrial, educational, and religious institutions to provide parking space. The ordinance allowed a grace period for existing structures to comply, with educational institutions given five years. Procedural History: On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina ordered SSC and SSA-Marikina to demolish and replace their existing fence to comply with the 80% see-thru requirement and to move it back six meters for parking. The respondents requested an extension, but the city officials insisted on enforcement. Consequently, SSC and SSA-Marikina filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 273. The RTC granted the petition, issuing a writ of prohibition to permanently stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents' property, finding the ordinance an invalid exercise of police power and an appropriation of property without due process. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, dismissing the petitioners' appeal. The Petition: Petitioners, officials of the City Government of Marikina, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the CA's decision. They argue that the CA erred in declaring City Ordinance No. 192 as not a valid exercise of police power, in ruling it was an exercise of eminent domain, in finding a violation of the due process clause, and in declaring that the ordinance could not be given retroactive application. While petitioners admit Section 5 (the five-meter setback) is invalid, they contend it was cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303 and that Section 3.1 (the 80% see-thru fence requirement) remains valid and enforceable.
Issue(s)
Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power. Whether the setback requirement under Section 5 constitutes a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Whether the 80% see-thru fence requirement under Section 3.1 is reasonably necessary for public safety and does not unduly oppress private rights or violate privacy. Whether Zoning Ordinance No. 303 cured the invalidity of Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192. Whether Ordinance No. 192 can be given retroactive application.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with modification to the dispositive portion. A writ of prohibition is issued commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the respondents' property.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Validity of Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192: The Court held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not contravene the Constitution or statute, be unfair or oppressive, partial or discriminatory, prohibit but may regulate trade, be general and consistent with public policy, and be reasonable. Ordinance No. 192 was enacted under the City's police power, which requires a lawful subject and a lawful method. The means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The Court found that Sections 3.1 and 5 failed these tests. On the Setback Requirement (Section 5): The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings that the five-meter setback requirement for parking was an invalid exercise of police power. It constituted a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, violating Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The Court rejected the argument that ownership remained with the respondents, stating that impairment of beneficial use is sufficient for a taking. The Court also found no logical connection between providing a parking area and the stated objectives of preventing concealment of unlawful acts or "un-neighborliness." Furthermore, the beautification purpose was deemed insufficient to justify the permanent divestment of beneficial use. On the 80% See-Thru Fence Requirement (Section 3.1): The Court found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement was not reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of discouraging the concealment of unlawful acts and preventing crime. The Court questioned whether such a fence provided better security or deterrence than a solid wall, noting it could even entice criminals and be easier to breach. The Court also reiterated that aesthetic purposes alone do not justify infringing on private rights. Moreover, the requirement was found to be violative of the respondents' right to privacy, given that the residence of Benedictine nuns was located within the property. On Zoning Ordinance No. 303 Curing Section 5: The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that Zoning Ordinance No. 303 cured the invalidity of Section 5. The Court noted that this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, violating the rule against changing legal theories. Furthermore, the Court found that the two ordinances had different purposes and subjects, and Ordinance No. 303 did not appear to have the same purpose as the setback provision in Ordinance No. 192. On Retroactivity and Curative Statutes: The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the retroactivity issue due to the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5. However, it clarified that Ordinance No. 192 was not a curative statute. Curative statutes are meant to correct defects in prior laws or validate legal proceedings, not to add provisions to existing laws or supply deficiencies in codes. The Court found no specific defect in the National Building Code that Ordinance No. 192 sought to cure. It also noted that respondents had already complied with parking requirements under the National Building Code.
Main Doctrine
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Marikina City Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, requiring an 80% see-thru fence and a five-meter setback for parking, are invalid exercises of police power as they are unreasonable, oppressive, and violate the rights to property and privacy. The setback requirement constitutes a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and the see-thru fence requirement is not reasonably necessary for public safety and unduly infringes upon privacy.