Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In 1989, a bargaining deadlock occurred between the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union) and International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI), leading to a strike by the Union and a lockout by IPI. DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued decisions on December 26, 1990, and December 5, 1991, resolving the dispute. The first decision recognized the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent, dismissed contempt charges, found no unfair labor practice, dismissed IPI's petition to declare the strike illegal, and directed the parties to enter into a new CBA. The second decision dismissed motions for reconsideration and ordered IPI to reinstate specific employees with full backwages and to reinstate other listed employees. Procedural History: IPI initially filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 103330) challenging the DOLE Secretary's decisions, which was dismissed on October 14, 1992. After the decisions became final, the Union moved for their execution. Various motions for execution were filed, and on April 12, 1995, DOLE Regional Director Alan M. Macaraya issued a Notice of Computation/Execution ordering IPI to pay P43,650,905.87 to 962 employees. Subsequent writs of execution were issued, but IPI appealed, leading to the recall of a writ by Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes on December 22, 1995. DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing reinstated the writ on August 27, 1996, finding quitclaims executed by employees unconscionable. After further proceedings and partial satisfaction of the writ, Acting DOLE Secretary Jose M. Español, Jr. affirmed previous orders on March 27, 1998, declaring the case closed and terminated. This order was affirmed by DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas on July 4, 2001. The Petition: Petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Jaime Sarmiento, and Gregorio Barredo, among others, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the July 4, 2001 order of the DOLE Secretary. The CA dismissed their petition on May 30, 2003, and denied their motion for reconsideration on October 30, 2003, holding that the decisions and incidents had long attained finality and had been executed. The petitioners then filed the present petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA gravely abused its discretion by holding that the execution of the DOLE final judgments would amend them, failing to implement the doctrine that similarly situated employees have the right to prove their entitlement, holding the judgments had been executed when respondents admitted otherwise, and finding that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing full execution. They contend that the writs of execution were only partially satisfied and that backwages and separation pay from March 16, 1995, onwards were still due.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for certiorari. Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when an appeal under Rule 45 is available. Whether the execution of the DOLE Secretary's final orders was only partially satisfied, thus warranting further execution. Whether the claims for backwages and separation pay beyond March 15, 1995, are legally tenable.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Propriety of Certiorari and Grave Abuse of Discretion by the CA: The Court reiterated that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and cannot substitute for an appeal under Rule 45 when the latter provides a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that an appeal was inadequate to address their grievances. The mere averment of grave abuse of discretion does not automatically warrant certiorari if a regular appeal is available and sufficient. The Court emphasized that the inadequacy of a remedy, not just its absence, determines the propriety of certiorari. While certiorari can be availed of in exceptional circumstances to prevent a substantial wrong or do substantial justice, the petitioners failed to establish such circumstances. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The CA correctly upheld the DOLE Secretary's declaration that the full satisfaction of the writs of execution had terminated the labor dispute. The CA's reasoning, that final and executory decisions, especially those already executed, cannot be amended except for clerical errors, is consistent with established jurisprudence. The CA's reliance on the finality of the DOLE Secretary's orders dated December 24, 1997, and March 27, 1998, which affirmed earlier orders granting execution, was also proper. On the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy: The Court reiterated that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and cannot substitute for an appeal under Rule 45 when the latter provides a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that an appeal was inadequate to address their grievances. The mere averment of grave abuse of discretion does not automatically warrant certiorari if a regular appeal is available and sufficient. The Court emphasized that the inadequacy of a remedy, not just its absence, determines the propriety of certiorari. While certiorari can be availed of in exceptional circumstances to prevent a substantial wrong or do substantial justice, the petitioners failed to establish such circumstances. On the Satisfaction of Writs of Execution and Claims of Other Employees: The Court found that the records contradicted the petitioners' insistence that the writs of execution were only partially satisfied. The 15 employees, including the petitioners, received their portion of the award covered by the September 3, 1996 writ of execution for ₱3,416,402.10, evidenced by their execution of a Satisfaction of Judgment and Quitclaim/Release. This execution formed the basis for the DOLE Secretary's declaration that the case was closed and terminated. Regarding unsatisfied portions of the award for other employees allegedly similarly situated, the Court stated that the petitioners were not the proper parties to ventilate these concerns. It noted that such concerns had already been addressed and resolved in another related case (G.R. No. 164633). On Claims for Backwages and Separation Pay Beyond March 15, 1995: The Court ruled that the demand for separation pay and backwages from March 16, 1995, onwards lacked legal basis. While the December 5, 1991 decision ordered reinstatement with backwages, reinstatement was no longer possible, and separation pay was awarded in lieu thereof. The Court held that the employment of the 15 employees, or the possibility of their reinstatement, terminated by March 15, 1995. Therefore, claims for separation pay and backwages beyond this date were unwarranted. The computation of such awards should not extend beyond the date of actual separation or when reinstatement became impossible.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for an appeal under Rule 45 when the latter provides a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The inadequacy of the remedy, not merely its absence, determines the propriety of certiorari. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari must demonstrate grave abuse of discretion, not merely reversible error.