Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, authorized by Baguio City Ordinance 003-2000, clamped two vehicles for illegal parking and failure to pay fees. Respondents Benedicto Balajadia and Edwin Ang, along with others, allegedly dismantled and removed these clamps. Jadewell filed criminal complaints for robbery, while respondents filed counter-complaints for usurpation of authority or grave coercion. The Provincial Prosecutor found no probable cause for robbery but recommended filing charges for violation of Section 21 of City Ordinance No. 003-2000 against the respondents for removing the clamps and failing to pay the prescribed fees. Procedural History: Two criminal Informations for violation of City Ordinance No. 003-2000 were filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935. The respondents filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the offenses had prescribed, as the Informations were filed on October 2, 2003, nearly five months after the alleged commission on May 7, 2003, and that violations of municipal ordinances prescribe after two months under Act No. 3326. The MTC granted the motion and dismissed the cases. Jadewell's motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, Jadewell filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), arguing that the MTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The RTC dismissed the petition, upholding the MTC's dismissal. Jadewell's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation seeks, via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to reverse the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstate Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935. The core issue is whether the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003, tolled the two-month prescriptive period for violations of city ordinances, as provided by Act No. 3326. Petitioner argues that the filing with the prosecutor's office interrupts prescription, citing Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and distinguishing the case from Zaldivia v. Reyes which involved a municipal ordinance and the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondents maintain that only the filing of the Information in court interrupts prescription, as per Zaldivia v. Reyes and the Rules on Summary Procedure, and that the offenses had prescribed before the Informations were filed.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of the Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003, tolled the prescription period for violations of City Ordinance No. 003-2000. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of prescription.
Ruling
The Petition is denied. The Regional Trial Court did not err in upholding the Municipal Trial Court's dismissal of the cases on the ground of prescription. The filing of the Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor did not interrupt the prescriptive period for violations of city ordinances under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Ratio Decidendi
On the interruption of the prescriptive period for violations of city ordinances: The Court reiterated that Act No. 3326, as amended, governs the prescription of violations of special laws and municipal ordinances, establishing a two-month prescriptive period for violations of city ordinances. The commencement of the prescription period is from the day of the commission of the violation. Crucially, for offenses covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which include violations of city ordinances, the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court. The Court emphasized that the filing of the Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor does not constitute the institution of judicial proceedings required to toll the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 and the Rules on Summary Procedure. This interpretation aligns with the ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, which held that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings, and the filing with the prosecutor's office is an administrative or preliminary step, not a judicial one. The Court noted that while the Rules on Criminal Procedure might provide for interruption upon filing with the prosecutor in other contexts, the Rules on Summary Procedure, as a special law governing ordinance violations, must prevail. Therefore, the filing of the Informations on October 2, 2003, was beyond the two-month prescriptive period that began on May 7, 2003, rendering the dismissal by the MTC proper. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. The judge's dismissal of the cases was based on a correct application of the law and procedural rules concerning prescription for ordinance violations under the Rules on Summary Procedure. The judge correctly applied the doctrine that only the filing of the Information in court interrupts the prescriptive period for such offenses. The petitioner's argument that the filing with the prosecutor should suffice was contrary to the established jurisprudence and the specific rules governing summary procedures. The Court acknowledged that this interpretation, as highlighted in Zaldivia v. Reyes, might lead to cases prescribing even if filed seasonably with the prosecutor, but stated that the remedy lies in amending the rules, not in misinterpreting them. Thus, the dismissal was a valid exercise of judicial authority, not a grave abuse thereof.
Main Doctrine
For offenses covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, specifically violations of city ordinances, the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court, not by the filing of the affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor's office.