Mojica v. Agoncillo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Artemio Mojica, a policeman, was suspended on December 15, 1920, for killing Crispin Macasinag. He was subsequently convicted of homicide and sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal. On April 22, 1921, the Mayor of Manila ordered his dismissal from the service, effective December 15, 1920, but stated it was without prejudice to his reinstatement if acquitted. Procedural History: Mojica appealed his conviction, and the Supreme Court acquitted him on the ground of self-defense. He was reinstated on February 18, 1922. He then applied for payment of his salary from December 15, 1920, to February 18, 1922. The Secretary of the Interior denied his petition. The Petition: Mojica filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the payment of his back salary, alleging that the dismissal order should have been retroactive to December 15, 1920, and that the denial of his petition was unlawful. The respondent argued that there was no law authorizing back salary payment and that Mojica was removed, not merely suspended.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner is entitled to back salary from December 15, 1920, to February 18, 1922, despite his dismissal and subsequent reinstatement. Whether the order of dismissal, made without prejudice to reinstatement upon acquittal, should be considered retroactive to the date of suspension.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. While the Court believes that, as a matter of justice, the city should pay the petitioner's claim, the stipulated facts do not support the issuance of the writ.
Ratio Decidendi
On the entitlement to back salary and the retroactivity of the dismissal order: The Court noted that the order of dismissal on April 22, 1921, stated it was effective as of December 15, 1920, and was without prejudice to reinstatement upon acquittal. However, the subsequent appointment order on February 21, 1922, which was approved on March 24, 1922, appointed Mojica as a third-class patrolman and expressly stated that the appointment was to take effect on February 18, 1922. There was no proof that the dismissal order was intended to have retroactive effect from December 15, 1920, in the manner alleged by the petitioner. The appointment itself was a new one, not a simple restoration to his previous status with back pay. The Court emphasized that the appointment order explicitly stated its effective date as February 18, 1922, and made no mention of reinstatement or suspension. Therefore, the petitioner failed to prove that the dismissal order was made retroactive as alleged, which was a crucial point for his claim of back salary. The Court concluded that the record was conclusive that nothing more was done than to appoint the petitioner to a new position with a specified effective date, thus failing to establish the basis for a writ of mandamus to compel payment of back salary for the intervening period. On the nature of the dismissal and reinstatement: The Court acknowledged that the petitioner was a policeman who killed Crispin Macasinag in self-defense, as established by his acquittal in the Supreme Court. The Court recognized that his suspension and dismissal, in the event of acquittal, should ideally have been made retroactive to December 15, 1920, to avoid injustice. However, the procedural facts, specifically the terms of the reinstatement as a new appointment effective February 18, 1922, did not support the petitioner's claim for back salary. The Court found that the dismissal order, while stating it was without prejudice to reinstatement, was not proven to be retroactive. The subsequent appointment was a new engagement, not a continuation of his prior service with back pay. Consequently, the failure to prove the alleged retroactivity of the dismissal order was fatal to the petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the payment of back salary.
Main Doctrine
A writ of mandamus to compel the payment of back salaries during a period of suspension and dismissal, even if the employee is subsequently acquitted and reinstated, will be denied if the order of dismissal was not made retroactive and the reinstatement is a new appointment taking effect on a specific future date, not a restoration to the prior status with back pay.