Laplana v. Garchitorena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Josefa Laplana, as administratrix of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, sued Mariano Garchitorena Chereau and Andree Garchitorena Chereau to compel them to execute a mortgage on certain real property and to recover an indebtedness secured by the promised mortgage. The plaintiff also sought a preventive annotation of her right to be secured by the mortgage for lis pendens. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance granted the lis pendens order but refused to order the execution of a formal mortgage. It rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay P24,902.86 with interest and P2,000 for expenses and attorney's fees. The plaintiff appealed the refusal to order the mortgage, and the defendants appealed the monetary judgment. The Appeal: The plaintiff-appellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to order the execution of the mortgage. The defendants-appellants contended that the action was prematurely brought and that the amount of indebtedness was misrepresented, claiming the document admitting the debt was obtained by fraud and deceit. They also questioned the timeliness of the plaintiff's appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the action was prematurely brought before the maturity date of the debt. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to both a money judgment and the enforcement of the promise to constitute a mortgage.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the monetary judgment awarded to the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay P24,902.86 with interest and P2,000 for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. The decision was modified to include a pronouncement that the indebtedness constitutes a lien upon the Hacienda Salvacion, and a certified copy of the dispositive portion was ordered to be sent to the register of deeds to note the existence of this lien.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the action was not premature. Applying Article 1129, No. 3 of the Civil Code, the Court held that the debtor loses the benefit of the period when the security is diminished. By mortgaging Lot No. 2 to a third party (Martin) instead of the plaintiff as promised, Mariano Garchitorena effectively diminished the value of the security he had contracted to provide. This act conferred upon the creditor the right to treat the whole debt as immediately due. The Court rejected the defendants' argument that they only needed to execute the mortgage once the entire hacienda (all lots) was registered, calling it an 'untenable evasion' of the spirit of the agreement. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the trial court erred in finding the two remedies—recovery of debt and enforcement of mortgage—to be inconsistent. While Article 1862 of the Civil Code states that a promise to constitute a mortgage creates only a personal obligation and no 'real' right in the property, such an agreement is lawful and enforceable. Invoking the maxim 'equity regards that as done which ought to be done,' the Court held that between the parties, the property should be considered subject to the lien as if the mortgage had been executed. Therefore, the Court did not compel the physical execution of a new document but instead judicially declared the existence of a lien on the property to protect the creditor's rights.
Main Doctrine
An agreement to constitute a mortgage, even if it only creates a personal obligation, is legally binding and can be enforced by the creditor. The principle of equity, which regards that as done which ought to be done, allows a court to declare the existence of a lien upon the property as if the mortgage had been formally executed, especially when the parties have agreed to its creation and the conditions for its execution have been met. This ensures that the creditor's rights are adequately protected.