Tan v. Matsuura
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Antonio L. Tan, Jr. (Tan) filed a complaint-affidavit charging Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina Tanjutco, and Atty. Julie Cua with falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Tan alleged that a Deed of Trust, pre-signed by him in blank, was stolen and subsequently filled with false entries regarding the number of shares and date, and that it was falsely notarized by Atty. Cua without his appearance or oath. Tan claimed Matsuura and Tanjutco used these falsified documents in other cases, causing him prejudice. Procedural History: The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City initially dismissed Tan's complaint for lack of probable cause, finding that Tan had voluntarily signed the deed and that the element of damage was not sufficiently shown. Tan's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Secretary of Justice initially denied the petition but later granted a motion for reconsideration, finding probable cause to indict Matsuura and Tanjutco, citing discrepancies in the deed's print and font styles and the absence of a notarized copy in Matsuura's earlier SEC filing. However, the DOJ later excluded Cua from the charges. Subsequently, the DOJ reversed itself again, directing Cua's inclusion. Matsuura and Tanjutco filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) regarding the DOJ's resolutions, while Cua also filed a separate petition after the DOJ's final reversal. The CA granted both petitions, setting aside the DOJ's resolutions and upholding the OCP's dismissal. The Petition: Tan filed two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. G.R. No. 179003 assails the CA's decision in the petition filed by Matsuura and Tanjutco, while G.R. No. 195816 assails the CA's decision in the petition filed by Cua. The petitions raise two main issues: (a) whether the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petitions for certiorari, assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice; and (b) whether the CA erred in upholding the finding of no probable cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco, and Cua for falsification. Tan also raised a procedural issue regarding the CA's grant of an extension of time for Cua to file her petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in taking cognizance of the Rule 65 petitions, effectively assuming the role of a reviewing authority over the Secretary of Justice. Whether there exists probable cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco, and Cua for the crime of falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition in G.R. No. 179003 and denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 195816. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 6, 2007 and Resolution dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, and denied the motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of the petition in G.R. No. 195816. The Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the petitions and in upholding the finding of no probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco, and Cua.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly took cognizance of the petitions for certiorari. While the determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution includes the authority to determine if there has been grave abuse of discretion by any branch of government. Although policy dictates deference to prosecutors, courts do not shirk from exercising review when findings are unsupported by facts or law. Applying the doctrine in Tan v. Ballena, the Court noted that where the Secretary of Justice issues varying and contradictory findings, a clear issue on the appreciation of facts arises, justifying judicial intervention. This ensures that while criminals are prosecuted, the innocent are spared from baseless and groundless prosecution. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that no probable cause existed to indict the respondents for falsification. Regarding Article 171(6) and 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), Tan failed to prove that the alleged alterations changed the document's meaning or were false. The Court applied the presumption from Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; thus, Tan's voluntary signature implies consent to the contents. Concerning Article 171(2), Tan's bare denial of appearance before the notary was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to the public document and the notary's official duties. Since Matsuura and Tanjutco are private individuals, they could only be liable for a violation of Article 171 in conspiracy with a notary, and because the case against Atty. Cua was dismissed, the charges against them necessarily lacked basis. The Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion by relying on surmises and conjectures rather than the established quantum of evidence required for probable cause.
Main Doctrine
The Court of Appeals may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari to review the findings of the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation if there is grave abuse of discretion, such as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored. A finding of probable cause requires more than mere suspicion and must be based on facts and circumstances that would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.