Mamaril v. Boy Scout of the Philippines
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Spouses Benjamin and Sonia Mamaril, jeepney operators, parked their six jeepneys nightly at the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) compound for a fee. On May 26, 1995, one jeepney was missing and never recovered. Security guards Cesario Peña and Vicente Gaddi of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB), contracted by BSP for security, admitted that a familiar-looking male person took the vehicle. Sps. Mamaril alleged the loss was due to the gross negligence of the security guards who allowed the vehicle to be driven out by a stranger, contrary to their agreement that only authorized drivers endorsed by the owners could do so. Procedural History: Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages against BSP, AIB, Peña, and Gaddi. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found BSP, AIB, Peña, and Gaddi jointly and severally liable for the loss of the vehicle and other damages. The RTC later modified its decision, reducing the vehicle's cost. BSP appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the negligence of Peña and Gaddi but absolved BSP, holding that the Guard Service Contract was purely between BSP and AIB, with no stipulation for third-party liability. The CA also ruled that the agreement between Sps. Mamaril and BSP was a contract of lease, not making BSP an insurer. The CA deleted awards for accessories, loss of income, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Sps. Mamaril's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Sps. Mamaril filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that BSP should be held liable based on the Guard Service Contract and the parking ticket, and that the CA erred in deleting the RTC awards for damages and attorney's fees.
Issue(s)
Whether the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) should be held liable for the loss of the jeepney. Whether the Guard Service Contract between BSP and AIB Security Agency, Inc. created obligations and liabilities in favor of third persons like the petitioners. Whether the agreement between BSP and Spouses Mamaril constituted a contract of lease, and if so, what were the obligations of BSP as lessor, including the validity of the exculpatory clause in the parking ticket. Whether Spouses Mamaril are entitled to damages and attorney's fees.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the liability of the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP): The Court affirmed the CA's ruling absolving BSP from liability. It was established that the proximate cause of the loss was the negligence of security guards Peña and Gaddi. However, no finding of negligence was made against BSP. The Court clarified that the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply because no employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards; they were employees of AIB. Furthermore, the Court found no principal-agent relationship between BSP and the security guards. BSP merely hired AIB's services for property protection, not to act as its agent. The Guard Service Contract was between BSP and AIB, and it did not contain any stipulation pour autrui in favor of third persons like the Spouses Mamaril. The Court reiterated the principle of relativity of contracts, stating that contracts take effect only between the parties thereto. On the Guard Service Contract between BSP and AIB Security Agency, Inc.: The Court found that the Guard Service Contract was between BSP and AIB, and it did not contain any stipulation pour autrui in favor of third persons like the Spouses Mamaril. The Court reiterated the principle of relativity of contracts, stating that contracts take effect only between the parties thereto. On the nature of the agreement between BSP and Spouses Mamaril and the exculpatory clause: The Court concurred with the CA that the agreement was a contract of lease, as defined under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. The Spouses Mamaril paid a monthly fee for parking slots, parked their vehicles, and took the keys home. Under Article 1654, the lessor's obligations include delivering the thing for use and maintaining the lessee in its enjoyment. Article 1664 states that the lessor is not obliged to answer for mere acts of trespass by third persons. BSP fulfilled its obligation by providing a suitable parking space and hiring security guards. Therefore, BSP should not be held liable for the loss, which was caused by the negligence of the security guards and the mishandling of the vehicles coordinated with AIB without BSP's knowledge. The Court addressed the Spouses Mamaril's contention that the exculpatory clause, "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein," was void. The Court held that contracts of adhesion are not void per se and are binding if accepted without objection. Given that the Spouses Mamaril had been leasing parking space for approximately 20 years, they were deemed to have accepted the terms. The minimal parking fee also did not create an inference that BSP undertook to be an insurer of the vehicles' safety. On damages and attorney's fees: The Court affirmed the CA's deletion of the awards for damages and attorney's fees. For the accessories, Sonia P. Mamaril failed to present receipts to substantiate the claim of ₱50,000.00. For the daily loss of income of ₱275.00, no records or journals were submitted. The Court emphasized that actual damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. The awards for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees were also deleted by the CA for lack of factual and legal bases, as the RTC failed to provide sufficient justification for these awards.
Main Doctrine
A client of a security agency is not liable for the negligence of the agency's guards, as the employer-employee relationship lies with the agency. Furthermore, a contract of lease for parking space does not make the lessor an insurer of the lessee's vehicle, and an exculpatory clause in a parking ticket, if accepted, is binding.