Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Leonel P. Labrador, former Chief of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's (POEA) Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD), was dismissed from service on May 2, 1997, by the then-Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing. This dismissal stemmed from a finding that Labrador accepted a bribe of P6,200.00 from an overseas Filipino worker to expedite the issuance of an employment certificate. Labrador's dismissal was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Concurrently, a criminal case for direct bribery was filed against him, resulting in his conviction by the Sandiganbayan (SB) on August 31, 1999, and a sentence including temporary special disqualification from public office. This conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Procedural History: Following his conviction, Labrador applied for probation, which the Sandiganbayan initially granted. However, the Sandiganbayan later revoked the probation, deeming it erroneously granted due to Labrador's prior appeal from his conviction, and directed him to serve the penalties imposed, including disqualification from office. Upon receiving notice of this resolution, the POEA Administrator issued an order on March 11, 2004, separating Labrador from service. Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued an Audit Observation Memorandum noting the payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador from August 31, 1999, to March 15, 2004, despite his dismissal. This led to a Notice of Disallowance, which the COA affirmed in a decision, holding petitioner Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, as then POEA Administrator, personally liable for the disallowed amount. The Petition: This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the COA's Decision No. 2009-121 and Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002. The petitioner argues that the COA gravely abused its discretion in holding her personally liable for the salaries and benefits paid to Labrador. She contends that she acted in good faith, as Labrador's dismissal records were not in his personnel file, and she was only fully apprised of his conviction and disqualification upon receiving the Sandiganbayan's resolution revoking his probation. The petition also questions the reckoning point for the disallowance, arguing it should not precede the Sandiganbayan's resolution revoking probation. The Supreme Court is asked to determine if the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in its disallowance and in imposing personal liability on the petitioner.
Issue(s)
Whether grave abuse of discretion attended the COA's disallowance of salaries and benefits paid to Labrador, and the proper reckoning point for the disallowance. Whether the period of disallowance should be reckoned from May 2, 1997 (date of administrative dismissal), May 3, 2000 (date criminal conviction became final), or March 2, 2004 (date probation was revoked). Whether petitioner Dimapilis-Baldoz should be held personally liable for the disallowed disbursements.
Ruling
The petition is partly granted. The COA's Notice of Disallowance and Decision are affirmed with modification: (a) the portion pertaining to petitioner Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz's personal liability is deleted; and (b) the proper period of disallowance is adjusted to commence from May 2, 1997, the date of Leonel P. Labrador's administrative dismissal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the disallowance and the reckoning point: The Court affirmed the COA's authority to disallow illegal disbursements of government funds. However, it modified the reckoning point for the disallowance. The Court emphasized that Labrador was administratively dismissed on May 2, 1997, by the Labor Secretary, an order that was immediately executory. Therefore, Labrador should not have been allowed to report for work or receive any salary or benefit from that date onwards. The Court clarified that neither the grant nor the revocation of Labrador's probation affected his disqualification from office, as probation does not obliterate the crime or its penalties. Consequently, the disallowance should be reckoned from May 2, 1997, the date of his administrative dismissal, not from the finality of his criminal conviction or the revocation of his probation. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the COA's initial reckoning point of May 3, 2000, as the COA was not aware of the May 2, 1997 administrative dismissal. However, the Court corrected this oversight to prevent dissipation of government funds. On the period of disallowance: The Court clarified that neither the grant nor the revocation of Labrador's probation affected his disqualification from office, as probation does not obliterate the crime or its penalties. Consequently, the disallowance should be reckoned from May 2, 1997, the date of his administrative dismissal, not from the finality of his criminal conviction or the revocation of his probation. On the personal liability of Dimapilis-Baldoz: The Court found that Dimapilis-Baldoz acted in good faith and should not be held personally liable. She was not officially notified of the SB's orders and decisions regarding Labrador's conviction until the SB's March 2, 2004 Resolution revoking his probation. Labrador's 201 File at POEA lacked records of the SB case. Upon receiving notice, Dimapilis-Baldoz promptly issued the Separation Order. The Court reiterated that personal liability does not automatically attach to a superior officer merely for approving disbursements processed by subordinates, especially when acting in good faith and without knowledge of any impropriety. The burden of proving malice or bad faith was not met by the COA.
Main Doctrine
The period of disallowance of salaries and benefits paid to an employee dismissed from service should be reckoned from the date of administrative dismissal, not from the date the criminal conviction becomes final or when probation is revoked, especially when the administrative dismissal was immediately executory. Furthermore, personal liability for such disallowed disbursements cannot be imposed on an official who acted in good faith and without knowledge of the impropriety of the payments.