Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner was convicted by final judgment in consolidated cases (G.R. Nos. 132875-76) of multiple counts of offenses under the Revised Penal Code, for which he suffered principal penalties carrying the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. His prison term was commuted by Presidential Order of Commutation dated 2007-04-30 and he received a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on 2009-03-18. On 2012-04-26 petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City; the application was denied because of his prior conviction, prompting a Petition for Inclusion before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Pending resolution, petitioner filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) on 2012-10-05 to run for mayor in the May 13, 2013 elections. Procedural History: The MTCC denied petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion on 2012-10-18. The Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 affirmed that denial in an Order dated 2012-10-31, which became immediately final and executory under Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). Multiple petitions were filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) divisions seeking denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. The COMELEC En Banc motu proprio issued Resolution No. 9613 (2013-01-15) cancelling and denying due course to petitioner’s CoC on grounds of perpetual absolute disqualification and noncompliance with voter registration requirements. Thereafter, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the COMELEC En Banc action. The Petition: Petitioner contends that (a) the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction and violated his right to procedural due process by cancelling his CoC motu proprio without a motion for reconsideration of a division decision, and (b) Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) had removed his perpetual absolute disqualification, rendering him eligible to run.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction and violated petitioner’s right to procedural due process by issuing motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 cancelling petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy. Whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office was removed by Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), thereby rendering him eligible to run for mayor.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC En Banc acted within its administrative authority in cancelling petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy motu proprio because petitioner’s disqualification was conclusively established by a final judgment of conviction, and that Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code did not remove the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification imposed under the Revised Penal Code; therefore petitioner remains disqualified to run for elective office.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction and violated due process: The Court reasoned that Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution requires a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc only when the Commission is exercising its quasi-judicial power. The Court applied the established distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions as articulated in Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, noting that administrative action does not entail an opportunity to be heard or the weighing of evidence. The cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy based on a conclusive final judgment of conviction falls within the COMELEC’s mandate to enforce and administer election laws and thus is administrative in nature; accordingly, the COMELEC may act motu proprio in such circumstances. The Court applied its prior rulings in Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Agapito Cardino v. Commission on Elections which held that the COMELEC has a legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from perpetual disqualification by virtue of final judgment, even without a petition. Because petitioner’s disqualification and the denial of his voter registration had attained finality, the COMELEC En Banc did not violate procedural due process in cancelling the CoC administratively. On Whether Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code removed petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification: The Court began with the canon that statutes on the same subject must be harmonized where possible. It contrasted Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which generally allows a prior convict to run for local elective office two years after serving sentence, with the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Articles 30 and 41) that impose the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. The Court applied the principle of lex specialis derogat generali and held that the more specific penal provisions (Article 41 read with Article 30) prevail over the general rule in Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. The Court noted that Article 41 expressly provides that perpetual absolute disqualification continues to obtain even if the principal penalty is pardoned or commuted unless the accessory penalty is expressly remitted in the pardon; since petitioner’s Order of Commutation did not expressly remit the accessory penalty, the perpetual disqualification subsists. The Court relied on Lacuna v. Abes and subsequent jurisprudence confirming that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually," and thus petitioner remained ineligible despite the lapse of two years after serving his commuted sentence.
Main Doctrine
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may cancel motu proprio a certificate of candidacy when a candidate is conclusively disqualified by virtue of a final and executory judgment; statutory provisions imposing perpetual absolute disqualification under the Revised Penal Code prevail over the more general disqualification rule in Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.