Dizon v. De Taza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case involves an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Amado T. Dizon against Atty. Norlita De Taza. The complainant alleged that Atty. De Taza, engaged to represent Dizon and his siblings in a case before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 174552), demanded and received substantial sums of money from them. These payments were purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their case. Specifically, Atty. De Taza allegedly demanded P75,000.00 from the complainant and had previously received P800,000.00 from his sibling, Aurora Dizon, for the same stated purpose. Procedural History: The complainant discovered that the Supreme Court had already denied their petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza's representations that the case was still pending. After failing to locate Atty. De Taza, the complainant filed the disbarment complaint on November 6, 2007. The complaint was bolstered by affidavits from other individuals attesting to Atty. De Taza's issuance of bouncing checks and failure to repay debts. Despite multiple attempts by the Court to serve resolutions and require a comment from Atty. De Taza, including sending notices to her known addresses and eventually her U.S.A. address, the notices were returned unserved. Consequently, the Court deemed her to have waived her right to file a comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended a two-year suspension, which the IBP Board of Governors modified to a one-year suspension. The Petition: The core of the complaint, and the issue before the Supreme Court, is whether Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing checks and for demanding and receiving money from her clients under the false pretense of expediting court proceedings. The complainant presented documentary evidence, including handwritten receipts signed by Atty. De Taza, detailing the amounts received and the purported purpose of expediting their case. The Supreme Court noted that Atty. De Taza failed to refute the accusations and did not file a comment, despite numerous opportunities. The Court found that Atty. De Taza's conduct, including the issuance of worthless checks and the fraudulent scheme to extract money from clients by misrepresenting the status of their case and the possibility of expediting it, demonstrated deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct, rendering her unfit to practice law.
Issue(s)
Whether Atty. De Taza is administratively liable for gross misconduct and deceit for soliciting money to expedite a resolved case and for issuing multiple worthless checks. Whether the respondent's failure to file a comment and her relocation abroad prevents the Court from imposing administrative sanctions.
Ruling
The Supreme Court found Atty. Norlita De Taza administratively liable and suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years. The Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, modifying the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation. The dispositive portion states: "WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely."
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that respondent's actions were reprehensible and manifested a propensity for deceit. Applying the rule in Wilkie v. Atty. Limos, the issuance of checks that are later dishonored for being drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed in her. Furthermore, the respondent's solicitation of PHP 875,000 under the guise of expediting a case that had already been dismissed was a fraudulent scheme designed to 'milk' money from her clients. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, they are bound to render an accounting or immediately return the funds if the purpose is not met; here, the purpose was entirely non-existent. Such behavior constitutes a violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, as it uses the name of the Judiciary to perpetrate fraud. On Issue 2: The Court maintained that disciplinary proceedings are 'sui generis,' meaning they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal investigations. Citing Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, the Court emphasized that the primary objective is public interest—specifically, whether the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of the profession. Because the Court exhausted all means to provide notice, including service to the respondent's address in the United States which was returned 'unclaimed,' the respondent was deemed to have waived her right to file a comment. Her silence and failure to refute the substantial evidence against her did not hinder the Court's authority to mete out an appropriate sanction to preserve the purity of the legal profession.
Main Doctrine
A lawyer who demands and receives exorbitant sums of money from a client purportedly to expedite court proceedings, especially when the case has already been dismissed, and who also issues bouncing checks, is guilty of deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct, warranting suspension from the practice of law.