Republic v. Ortigas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership owned a parcel of land in Pasig City. Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Ortigas segregated a portion of its property for road widening for the C-5 flyover project, designating Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-meter area. The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the designated area. Consequently, Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into Lot 5-B-2-A-1 (utilized portion) and Lot 5-B-2-A-2 (unutilized portion). Ortigas alleged that it was not compensated for the use of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 and was requested by the DPWH to convey the property to the government. Procedural History: On February 14, 2001, Ortigas filed a petition for authority to sell Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to the government with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig. The RTC set the case for hearing, ordered publication of the petition and order, and directed service to various government offices. Despite due notice, no opposition was filed, and Ortigas presented its case ex parte. The RTC, finding merit in the petition, issued an order on June 11, 2001, authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an opposition and a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the property could only be conveyed by donation, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the appeal, holding that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable. The CA later denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration, citing lack of jurisdiction as the appeal raised only a question of law. The Petition: This case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH. The Republic seeks to nullify the CA's resolutions dismissing its appeal. The Republic argues that the CA erred in dismissing its appeal on technicalities and that the RTC erred in granting Ortigas the authority to sell the land, contending that the property could only be conveyed by donation to the government under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Republic's primary contention is that the property, having been designated for road widening, automatically became property of the state that could only be donated, not sold, to the government.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal based on technicalities regarding the mode of appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the appeal from the trial court order granting respondent Ortigas authority to sell the land to the Republic of the Philippines; specifically, whether Ortigas may sell its property to the government, or if it can only be conveyed by donation, considering Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529 and the government's power of eminent domain.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The trial court is directed to proceed with the case to determine just compensation.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal based on technicalities: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's dismissal of the appeal. It clarified that appeals from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 41 must raise questions of fact or both fact and law. Appeals raising purely questions of law must be taken to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The sole issue raised by the Republic before the CA was whether Ortigas' property could only be conveyed by donation under Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529, which involved the interpretation and application of the law, thus constituting a pure question of law. Therefore, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal for being filed through the wrong mode. The Court also noted that while orders denying motions for reconsideration are generally not appealable, an exception exists if the order completely disposes of a particular matter, making it a final order. However, this did not cure the procedural defect of the wrong mode of appeal. On whether respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government or only donate it: The Supreme Court ruled that Ortigas may sell its property to the government and must be compensated. The Court distinguished Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529, which applies to roads and streets within a subdivided property for the benefit of lot owners, from the present case where the property was taken at the instance of the government for public road widening. The Court reiterated the elements of "taking" in eminent domain: (1) government entry into private property; (2) indefinite or permanent entry; (3) color of legal authority; (4) devotion to public use; and (5) removal of all beneficial enjoyment from the owner. All these elements were present. The Court emphasized that Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529 cannot be interpreted to allow the government to disregard constitutionally guaranteed rights, particularly the right to just compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution. The government's power of eminent domain is inherent but delimited by the owner's right to compensation. Forcing a donation would constitute illegal taking. Therefore, the government must compensate the owner for property taken for public use, either through expropriation proceedings or a negotiated sale. The trial court was directed to proceed with determining just compensation.
Main Doctrine
Owners whose properties are taken and utilized for public road purposes are entitled to just compensation, and the government cannot compel donation of such property under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when the taking is at the instance of the government for public use.