Japco v. City of Manila
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs, whose businesses were adversely affected, challenged the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 1181, which imposed a fee of 5 centavos on each kilogram of meat slaughtered in the city's matadero. They argued the ordinance was not published in two daily newspapers of general circulation as required by Section 2443 of the Administrative Code. Procedural History: A preliminary injunction was issued on May 3, 1924, restraining the city from enforcing the ordinance. On September 29, 1924, the lower court ruled that publication in the Official Gazette was sufficient, citing Rodriguez vs. City of Manila, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the complaint. On December 31, 1924, over three months after the judgment, the defendants moved for a writ of execution for damages allegedly suffered due to the injunction, totaling P38,067. This motion was denied on January 6, 1925, for lack of a judgment for damages. Subsequently, the court granted a motion to set a hearing for damages, but later revoked this order on February 28, 1925, deeming the right to claim damages lost due to the motion being filed after the judgment became final. The Petition: Defendants appealed the orders denying their motion for execution and revoking the order setting a hearing for damages.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in denying the motion for a writ of execution for damages suffered due to the preliminary injunction. Whether the lower court erred in setting aside its order that would have allowed the presentation of evidence on damages.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court. The appeal was dismissed without costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first assignment of error (denial of writ of execution): The Court held that the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision did not contain a judgment for damages susceptible of execution. While the decision mentioned stipulations of fact regarding daily revenue losses, this was merely a statement of fact and not a judgment. The clause stating the injunction bond would answer for damages did not constitute an award of damages without further hearing. The Court found this contention untenable, as the daily losses were an element for consideration but not a definitive award without further proceedings, which were not initiated within the proper timeframe. On the second assignment of error (setting aside the order for hearing on damages): The Court ruled that the motion to set the case for hearing on damages was filed on January 16, 1925, which was over two months after the judgment in the principal case had become final and passed beyond the court's control. Citing Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure and previous jurisprudence (Santos vs. Moir, Somes vs. Crossfield, Macatangay vs. Municipality of San Juan de Bocboc), the Court reiterated that damages for the issuance of a preliminary injunction must be determined in the principal action and included in the final judgment. This remedy is exclusive, and by failing to file the motion in time, the defendants lost their right to such damages.
Main Doctrine
A motion for the determination of damages caused by the issuance of a preliminary injunction, filed after the original decision has become final and passed beyond the control of the court, cannot be granted, as such damages must be determined in the principal action and included in the final judgment.