David v. Macasio

G.R. No. 195466 · 2014-07-02 · J. ARTURO D. BRION, J.: · Primary: Labor; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Respondent John G. Macasio filed a complaint against petitioner Ariel L. David, doing business as "Yiels Hog Dealer," for unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave (SIL) pay, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Macasio claimed to have been employed as a butcher by David since January 6, 1995, alleging that David exercised control over his work, including setting work hours, the number of hogs to be chopped, and approving leaves. David, however, contended that Macasio was hired on a "pakyaw" or task basis, starting his business in 2005 with ten employees, and that Macasio was not entitled to the claimed benefits. 2. Procedural History: The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Macasio's complaint, finding that he was engaged on a "pakyaw" or task basis and thus not entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL, and 13th month pay. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA's decision. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, partly granted Macasio's petition for certiorari, reversing the NLRC's ruling. The CA found Macasio to be a task-basis employee but not a "field personnel," making him entitled to holiday, SIL, and 13th month pay for three years, plus attorney's fees, while denying his claims for moral and exemplary damages. David's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the present petition. 3. The Petition: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, David argues that Macasio's engagement was on a "pakyaw" or task basis, excluding him from holiday, SIL, and 13th month pay. He reiterates that he had no control over the means and methods of Macasio's work and that Macasio was free to choose whether to report for work. David also contends that the factual findings of the LA and NLRC, which were supported by substantial evidence, should have attained finality and that the CA erred in reversing them. He further asserts that an employer-employee relationship does not exist due to the "pakyawan" arrangement.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent's claims for holiday pay, service incentive leave and 13th month pay by reason of respondent's alleged pakyaw or task basis engagement. Whether engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis negates the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Whether respondent qualifies as "field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code, thereby excluding him from the coverage of holiday pay and service incentive leave. Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing respondent's claims without determining if he was a "field personnel," in light of controlling jurisprudence, and whether the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion regarding 13th month pay.

Ruling

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision dated November 22, 2010 and resolution dated January 31, 2011 in all respects except insofar as the CA awarded 13th month pay; the Court held that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying 13th month pay because Section 3(e) of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 851 exempts employees paid on task basis from the 13th month pay. In all other respects the CA ruling that respondent is entitled to holiday pay and service incentive leave was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

On Whether the CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC: The Court explained that in a Rule 45 petition reviewing a CA decision rendered under a Rule 65 proceeding, the Supreme Court's review is confined to questions of law and to whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC. Citing Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation and Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, the Court emphasized that it must not undertake a factual appellate review. The Court found that the NLRC dismissed respondent's claims solely on the basis of the mode of payment without considering whether respondent was a "field personnel," contrary to settled jurisprudence. The Court held that this constituted a significant incompleteness in the NLRC's consideration of the case and therefore amounted to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the CA correctly reversed the NLRC on that ground. On Whether engagement on pakyaw negates employer-employee relationship: The Court rejected petitioner's contention that a pakyaw arrangement automatically negates an employment relationship. Applying the four-fold test (selection and engagement, payment of wages, power of dismissal, and power to control) and the control test, the Court found that the parties satisfied the elements of employment. The Court observed that Article 97(6) and Article 101 of the Labor Code treat wages paid on a task or piece basis as a method of pay computation and not as determinative of the existence of an employment relationship. The Court further reasoned that the existence of the right to control, rather than its actual exercise, is decisive under the control test and that the surrounding facts demonstrate such right and economic dependence. Accordingly, pakyaw engagement does not per se negate employer-employee status. On Whether respondent is a "field personnel" for holiday pay and SIL exemption: The Court carefully examined the statutory definition of "field personnel" in Article 82 and the Implementing Rules. Relying on Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista and Serrano v. Severino Santos Transit, the Court applied the rule of ejusdem generis and concluded that employees engaged on task basis are exempt from holiday pay and SIL only if they meet the specific criteria of "field personnel." The Court found that respondent performed duties at the employer's principal place of business, that his hours could be determined with reasonable certainty, and that employer supervision existed; therefore he is not a "field personnel." The Court affirmed the CA's reversal of the NLRC with respect to holiday pay and SIL because the NLRC failed to apply the settled rule and did not consider whether respondent was a field personnel. On Entitlement to 13th month pay and whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing respondent's claims without determining if he was a "field personnel": The Court distinguished the regime governing 13th month pay. It observed that Section 3(e) of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 851 expressly exempts those "paid on task basis" without reference to "field personnel." Unlike the IRR provisions on holiday and SIL which qualify the exemption by reference to field personnel, the implementing rules of P.D. No. 851 plainly exempt task-basis workers from 13th month pay. Consequently, the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion regarding 13th month pay and the petition is partially granted insofar as 13th month pay is concerned.

Main Doctrine

Employees engaged on pakyaw or task basis are not automatically excluded from entitlement to holiday pay and service incentive leave; they are excluded only if they qualify as "field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code, but employees paid on task basis are exempt from 13th month pay under Section 3(e) of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 851.

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