Cabling v. Lumapas
MODIFICATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Helen E. Cabling was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a property. A Final Deed of Sale was issued, and a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in her name. Petitioner filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. Procedural History: Respondent Joselin Tan Lumapas, claiming to be in actual possession of the property by virtue of a Deed of Conditional Sale from the original owner, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Hold in Abeyance the Implementation of the Writ of Possession. The RTC initially held the implementation in abeyance, then denied the motion for intervention. Subsequently, the RTC issued an order recalling the writ of possession, stating it could not be enforced against a third party in actual possession. The RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed petitioner's subsequent petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, affirming the RTC's orders, ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the writ as a third party was in possession claiming an adverse right. The Petition: Petitioner argues that the case is not an exception to the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession, contending that respondent's possession, based on a conditional sale, is not adverse to the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
Issue(s)
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling the writ of possession. Whether the respondent's possession of the foreclosed property, based on a Deed of Conditional Sale, is adverse to the judgment debtor/mortgagor, thus exempting her from the ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to issue a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner Helen E. Cabling.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and the nature of the respondent's possession: The Court held that the general rule is that the issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure sales under Act No. 3135 is ministerial. This duty to issue the writ ceases to be ministerial only when a third party is actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. The RTC and CA erred in recalling the writ of possession. On the issue of whether the respondent's possession is adverse: The exception contemplates a third party possessing the property by adverse title or right, such as a co-owner, tenant, or usufructuary, who possesses the property in their own right and not merely as a successor or transferee of the right of possession of another. In this case, the respondent's possession was premised on an alleged conditional sale. A conditional sale does not immediately transfer title; ownership is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition, typically the full payment of the purchase price. The Deed of Conditional Sale explicitly reserved ownership to the seller until full payment, and no deed of absolute sale was executed in the respondent's favor. Therefore, the respondent's possession could not be considered possession in the concept of an owner, nor was it adverse to the judgment debtor/mortgagor, as ownership and title remained with the seller until the property was transferred to the petitioner. Consequently, the exception to the ministerial issuance of the writ of possession did not apply, and the general rule should prevail.
Main Doctrine
The ministerial duty of a court to issue a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure sales ceases to be ministerial when a third party is in actual possession of the property claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor/mortgagor; however, possession based on a conditional sale, where ownership is retained by the seller until full payment, is not considered adverse to the judgment debtor/mortgagor.