Wee v. Mardo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Felicidad Mardo was granted Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284 for Lot No. 8348. On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly sold a portion of this lot, Lot No. 8348-B, to petitioner Josephine Wee for ₱250,000.00. Respondent refused to vacate, claiming the sale was falsified. Procedural History: Petitioner filed an Application for Original Registration of Lot No. 8348-B. Respondent opposed, alleging ownership and falsity of the deed of sale. The RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, respondent registered the land under OCT No. OP-1840. Petitioner filed a Notice of Lis Pendens and a motion for reconveyance, which the RTC denied. The RTC then granted petitioner's application for registration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision, denying the application for registration, holding that petitioner failed to comply with the possession and occupation requirements under P.D. No. 1529. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review of the CA decision, arguing that she should be deemed in possession through her predecessor-in-interest (respondent) and that the CA erred in not finding her entitled to registration. She also argues that denial of actual possession was due to a fortuitous event and that the CA should have ordered reconveyance due to fraudulent registration by the respondent.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not finding that petitioner is entitled to register the subject land under her name, considering the requirements of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation. Whether petitioner's lack of actual possession of the subject land can be excused as a fortuitous event, thereby still entitling her to registration. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent had possession and occupation of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and the implications of the existing Torrens title. Whether the Court of Appeals should have ordered the reconveyance of the subject parcel of land to the petitioner within the original registration proceedings, and the proper remedy for addressing claims of fraudulent registration.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Court of Appeals correctly reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The application for original registration of land already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 in the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo is a collateral attack on the existing title and is therefore not permissible. Petitioner's remedy lies in a separate, direct proceeding.
Ratio Decidendi
On the entitlement to registration and possession/occupation: The Court affirmed the CA's denial of the application for registration. Applicants for registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The CA correctly found that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of possession and occupation because she admitted the subject lot was not physically turned over to her, thus she could not have exercised acts of dominion. The theory that possession can be through a predecessor-in-interest does not apply when the alleged predecessor-in-interest is the one occupying the land and refusing to turn it over, claiming the sale was falsified. Furthermore, the subject land was already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 in the name of respondent Felicidad Gonzales, making it private property over which the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction. A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case, as a second decree for the same land would be null and void. On the issue of fortuitous event: The argument that denial of actual possession was due to a fortuitous event does not alter the fundamental requirement of possession and occupation for original registration under P.D. No. 1529. Even if the denial of possession was due to circumstances beyond petitioner's control, it does not negate the fact that she was not in actual possession and occupation of the land, which is a prerequisite for registration under Section 14(1). The Public Land Act provisions regarding fortuitous events do not override the specific requirements for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, especially when the land is already registered. On bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945: The Court did not directly rule on whether respondent had possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, as the primary issue was the collateral attack on an existing title. However, the fact that respondent possessed a Free Patent granted in 1979 and subsequently registered it under OCT No. OP-1840, which is a veritable Torrens title, indicates a claim of ownership that predates the petitioner's alleged sale in 1993. The Court emphasized that once a patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, indefeasible after one year. On the remedy of reconveyance: The Court held that the RTC was correct in denying petitioner's motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading for reconveyance within the original registration proceedings. An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. Such an attack is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The issue of fraudulent registration, even if true, must be raised in a separate, direct proceeding expressly instituted for that purpose, not as an incident in an application for registration. Registration does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy; however, the remedy must be pursued in the proper forum. The petitioner's remedy is to file a separate action for specific performance, reconveyance, or rescission, where she must prove her entitlement to the property, considering respondent's claim that the sale was falsified.
Main Doctrine
An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title and is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The remedy for alleged fraud in registration is a separate direct proceeding, not an application for registration.