Espiritu v. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 204964 · 2014-10-15 · J. LEONEN, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Land Reform
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: In 1978, Angeles City enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, classifying certain areas as agricultural. Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) allegedly obtained approval to reclassify Lot Nos. 854 and 855 in Barangay Margot and Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as non-agricultural or industrial lots on March 7, 1980. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was enacted on June 10, 1988. On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla, applied for exemption of these lots from CARP coverage. Then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan granted the exemption on February 19, 2004, citing DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. Procedural History: Farmers, led by Remigio Espiritu, moved for reconsideration, arguing the land was agricultural under various ordinances and certifications. Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman granted this motion and revoked the exemption order on June 15, 2006. Del Rosario contended she was not properly notified and only learned of the order on January 26, 2007, prompting her motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 3, 2008. Del Rosario appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which dismissed her appeal on May 7, 2009. The OP denied her motion for extension on July 14, 2009. Del Rosario then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing denial of due process and the invalidity of the OP decision due to the presiding official's alleged appointment to another office. The CA granted her petition on September 28, 2012, setting aside the OP decision and reinstating the Pagdanganan Order. Petitioners Espiritu and Noel Agustin sought review from the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioners argue that del Rosario was not denied due process and that the OP decision was valid. Respondent del Rosario maintains she was deprived of due process and the OP decision was void. The Supreme Court is tasked to determine if the CA erred in setting aside the orders of Secretary Pangandaman and Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite and reinstating Secretary Pagdanganan's order.

Issue(s)

Whether respondent Lutgarda Torres del Rosario was denied due process. Whether the decision of Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite dated May 7, 2009, is valid. Whether the subject landholdings were agricultural or non-agricultural prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.

Ruling

The petition is GRANTED. The decision dated September 28, 2012, and resolution dated November 29, 2012, of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The order dated June 15, 2006, of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the decision dated May 7, 2009, of the Office of the President are REINSTATED.

Ratio Decidendi

On whether respondent Lutgarda Torres del Rosario was denied due process: The Court ruled that del Rosario was not denied due process. While the Court of Appeals found that she was not properly notified of Secretary Pangandaman's order, it failed to consider that del Rosario was still able to file a motion for reconsideration. Although filed late, Secretary Pangandaman gave due course to this motion and resolved it on its merits. This demonstrates that she was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to present her arguments. The essence of procedural due process in administrative proceedings is a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side or seek reconsideration, which del Rosario received. Her active participation in subsequent appeals to the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals further negates any claim of complete denial of her day in administrative proceedings. On the validity of Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's decision: The Court held that the decision of Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite dated May 7, 2009, is presumed valid, effective, and binding. While it was alleged that Gaite had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to rendering the decision, no conclusive evidence was presented regarding the effective date of his appointment or assumption of office. Even assuming his appointment was effective, he could be considered a de facto officer. The acts of a de facto officer are as valid as those of a de jure officer concerning the public or third persons. Furthermore, official acts of public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity, which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of irregularity, which was not presented by the respondent. On whether the subject landholdings were agricultural or non-agricultural prior to Republic Act No. 6657: The Court found that the subject landholdings were agricultural. The primary basis for exemption from CARP coverage is that lands were zoned for non-agricultural use by the local government unit and that the zoning ordinance was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1998. In this case, certifications from the City Planning and Development Office and the HLURB indicated that the subject properties were classified as agricultural based on Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978. Ocular inspections also confirmed that the area remained agricultural, planted with sugar cane and corn. These findings were sustained by the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President, and the Court saw no reason to disturb these factual findings.

Main Doctrine

Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board or its predecessors prior to June 15, 1998, are outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, provided there is substantial evidence to prove such classification.

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