Hormillosa v. Director of Forestry
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Director of Lands initiated cadastral proceedings under Act No. 2259 for lot No. 1156. The Bureau of Forestry filed an opposition alleging the lot was within the proposed "Northern Forest Reservation" and thus government property. Leopoldo Hormillosa and the heirs of Custodio Duyuñgan filed claims of ownership. The lot was subdivided into 1156-A, 1156-B, and 1156-C. The court adjudicated 1156-A to Hormillosa, 1156-B to Duyuñgan heirs, and 1156-C to Lao Sangco. Procedural History: The provincial fiscal, on behalf of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a motion to reopen the case, alleging the decision was obtained through fraud and bad faith. Objections were filed, but the court ordered the case reopened. Leopoldo Hormillosa and "Viuda de Tan Toco" excepted and moved for a rehearing, which was denied. The Petition: Leopoldo Hormillosa and "Viuda de Tan Toco" appealed the order reopening the case, assigning errors related to the irrevocability of the decree and the Director of Forestry's loss of rights due to non-compliance with legal requirements.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in not holding that the decree of registration was entered within the meaning of section 38 of Act No. 496 and became irrevocable due to no petition for review being filed within one year. Whether the trial court erred in ordering the reopening of the case and not holding that the Director of Forestry lost all rights due to failure to formulate its claim within the granted period and lack of proper verification.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed. The order reopening the case is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue: The Court cited Delos Reyes vs. De Villa (48 Phil., 227) which squarely decided adverse to the appellants on the irrevocability of a decree of registration under section 38 of Act No. 496. The principle established in that case dictates that if a petition for review is not filed within the prescribed period, the decree becomes final and irrevocable. However, the present case involves a motion to reopen based on allegations of fraud, which is a distinct procedural remedy. On the second issue: The Court found that the Bureau of Forestry's opposition, though not verified, served as sufficient notice of the Government's claim. The proceedings were initiated by the Director of Lands, and the Bureau of Forestry, as another branch of the Government, appeared and filed its opposition. The notation on the record that the lands were "contested by the Bureau of Forestry" was considered official notice of the Government's claim. The Court also noted that an order setting aside a judgment and granting a new trial is generally not a final order appealable as a matter of right, and the reopening of the case was largely within the discretion of the trial court. The Court emphasized that if the appellants have a valid claim, it can be ascertained through a hearing on the merits, and if not, adjudging the titles to them would constitute a fraud upon the Government. The Court also pointed out that an order vacating a judgment and granting a new trial is not a final order from which an appeal will lie, making the appeal premature.
Main Doctrine
An order of the lower court setting aside and vacating a judgment and granting a new trial is not a final order from which an appeal will lie, and appeals taken prematurely are dismissed.