Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Development Bank of the Philippines
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against former members of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and officers of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC) for alleged violations of Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint stemmed from an investigation by the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, which concluded that RHC's loans from DBP, totaling ₱86.9 million and later ₱99.1 million by 1986, were behest in character due to undercollateralization, undercapitalization of the borrower, identification of officers as Marcos cronies, and alleged ownership of 20% of RHC shares by then-President Marcos. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman, in an Order dated July 19, 2011, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, citing the refusal of DBP to furnish documents identifying public respondents. Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, arguing that DBP directors were identified in a supplemental affidavit, the Ombudsman issued a second Order dated March 8, 2012, dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription, stating that the offenses charged had prescribed as the complaint was filed more than ten years from the discovery of the crimes on January 4, 1993. The Petition: The PCGG filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner contended that the prescriptive period should commence from the filing of the Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003, not from the discovery date of January 4, 1993, and that the prescriptive period for RA 3019 offenses is fifteen (15) years, not ten (10) years as held by the Ombudsman.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003, on the ground of prescription. Whether the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 should commence from the date of commission or the date of discovery of the offense, and whether the applicable prescriptive period for the offenses charged is ten (10) years or fifteen (15) years. Whether, based on the established date of discovery and the applicable prescriptive period, the filing of the Affidavit-Complaint was timely, and consequently, whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
Ruling
The petition is without merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the Orders of the Ombudsman dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. The Court held that the applicable prescriptive period for violations of RA 3019 committed prior to March 16, 1982, is ten (10) years, as provided in the original RA 3019. The Court further clarified that for offenses under special laws, like RA 3019, where the illegality is not immediately known, the prescriptive period begins to run from the discovery of the offense, as provided in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. In this case, the discovery of the behest nature of the loans was on January 4, 1993, when the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report. The filing of the complaint on January 6, 2003, was therefore belated, as it was filed slightly over ten (10) years from the date of discovery, exceeding the ten-year prescriptive period.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court concluded that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman correctly applied the law on prescription, considering both the applicable prescriptive period and the proper reckoning point for its commencement. The dismissal of the complaint was a valid exercise of the Ombudsman's authority based on the finding that the offenses had prescribed. On the issue of the prescriptive period and its commencement: The Court reiterated that Section 11 of RA 3019 originally provided a ten (10)-year prescriptive period for offenses under the said law. For crimes committed prior to the effectivity of BP Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, the ten-year period remains applicable. The offenses in this case fall under this category, thus the ten-year prescriptive period is the correct one. The Court applied Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which states that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. In cases involving special laws where the act is not obviously criminal, prescription commences from the discovery of the unlawful nature of the act. This principle was applied in previous cases involving behest loans, where the Court recognized the difficulty in discovering such violations. The Court clarified that 'discovery' refers to the point when the illegality becomes known or reasonably knowable, not merely the lack of knowledge. Behest loans can be concealed from the public eye through the suppression of documentation; therefore, the second mode of reckoning prescription from the date of discovery is applicable. The discovery of the behest nature of the RHC loans was established on January 4, 1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee submitted its report to the President. On the issue of the timeliness of the complaint and grave abuse of discretion: Based on the established date of discovery (January 4, 1993) and the ten-year prescriptive period, the filing of the Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003, was found to be belated. The period of prescription had already lapsed, making it proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss the complaint on this ground. The Court noted that the filing was 'a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery,' which clearly exceeded the ten-year prescriptive period.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, particularly for behest loans, generally commences from the discovery of the offense, not from the date of commission, especially when the nature of the transaction conceals the illegality from public view.