Garcia v. Sesbreño
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia filed two disbarment complaints against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio. In A.C. No. 7973, Garcia alleged that Sesbrefio, representing Garcia's adult daughters, filed an action for support against him and his sister. Garcia also alleged that Sesbrefio had a prior conviction for homicide and was only on parole, arguing this crime involves moral turpitude, thus disqualifying Sesbrefio from practicing law. In A.C. No. 10457 (initially CBC Case No. 08-2273), Garcia reiterated the same allegations, specifically citing Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Procedural History: Both cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. The IBP-CBD consolidated the cases and focused on the issue of whether homicide involves moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD found that the circumstances surrounding Sesbrefio's conviction for homicide involved moral turpitude and recommended disbarment. The IBP Board of Governors adopted this recommendation. Sesbrefio filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that homicide does not inherently involve moral turpitude and that executive clemency restored his rights. The IBP denied his motion. The Petition: The consolidated cases were elevated to the Supreme Court for resolution on the sole issue of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude.
Issue(s)
Whether conviction for the crime of homicide, under the specific circumstances of the case, involves moral turpitude. Whether respondent Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio should be disbarred based on his conviction for homicide, considering the commutation of his sentence and its effect on accessory penalties.
Ruling
The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD and Board of Governors. Respondent Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of the Decision. His name is ordered to be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude: The Court reiterated that moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It clarified that not all convictions for homicide involve moral turpitude; it depends on the attendant circumstances. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court stated that moral turpitude is a question of fact that frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. The Court reviewed its own decision in People v. Sesbreño, which found respondent guilty of homicide. The circumstances detailed in that decision showed that Sesbrefio, without provocation, fired his rifle at Luciano Amparado and his companion, who were merely passing by his house. Amparado was hit and died. An eyewitness confirmed Sesbrefio's indiscriminate firing. The Court agreed with the IBP-CBD that these circumstances bore the earmarks of moral turpitude, demonstrating extreme arrogance and a misplaced sense of superiority, reflecting poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. On the issue of whether respondent should be disbarred: The Court found that the conviction for homicide, under the specific circumstances of the case, involved moral turpitude. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. The Court rejected Sesbrefio's argument that executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Unlike the absolute and unconditional pardon in In re Atty. Parcasio, the commutation of Sesbrefio's sentence did not state it was absolute and unconditional. Furthermore, the Final Release and Discharge explicitly stated that accessory penalties not expressly remitted would subsist. Commutation is merely a reduction of penalty, not a wiping out of the crime or its consequences. The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those possessing good moral character, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies disbarment.
Main Doctrine
Conviction for homicide, depending on the attendant circumstances, may involve moral turpitude, which is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.