Veloso v. Salazar-Fernando
ABANDONMENTFacts
The Antecedents: The cases consolidated involve requests from Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Angelita A. Gacutan, and Vicente S.E. Veloso concerning the crediting of their previous services in other government branches for longevity pay and retirement benefits. Justice Salazar-Fernando requested her services as Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Commissioner be considered judicial service for longevity pay adjustment. Justice Gacutan requested her service as National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Commissioner be credited as judicial service for retirement and longevity pay, and for salary adjustment. Justice Veloso sought reconsideration of the denial of his request to credit his NLRC Commissioner service as judicial service for longevity pay, arguing that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347, which granted NLRC Commissioners the rank of CA Justice, should apply retroactively. Procedural History: Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS), recommended crediting Justice Salazar-Fernando's MTC service but denying her COMELEC service for longevity pay. Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO), recommended crediting Justice Gacutan's NLRC service for retirement but denying it for longevity pay, and denying her retroactive salary adjustment. Atty. Ferrer-Flores also recommended denying Justice Veloso's motion for reconsideration, stating his arguments were a rehash. The Petition: The core issue is whether services rendered outside the Judiciary, particularly in the COMELEC and NLRC, can be credited for longevity pay purposes under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, Section 42, and related laws, or if subsequent laws granting equivalent ranks and benefits to executive positions can alter this.
Issue(s)
Whether the services of Justice Salazar-Fernando as MTC Judge should be credited as judicial service for longevity pay. Whether the services of Justice Salazar-Fernando as COMELEC Commissioner should be credited as judicial service for longevity pay. Whether the services of Justice Gacutan as NLRC Commissioner should be credited for longevity pay. Whether the services of Justice Gacutan as NLRC Commissioner should be credited for retirement purposes. Whether RA 9347 should be applied retroactively to credit Justice Veloso's service as NLRC Commissioner for longevity pay, and general discussion on statutory construction and longevity pay.
Ruling
The Court resolved to: (1) GRANT the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit her services as MTC Judge for longevity pay computation; (2) DENY the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit her services as COMELEC Commissioner for longevity pay; (3) DENY the request of Justice Gacutan to credit her services as NLRC Commissioner for longevity pay; (4) GRANT the crediting of Justice Gacutan's NLRC service for retirement purposes; and (5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Justice Veloso. The Court also directed the Clerk of Court to proceed with handling granted longevity pay benefits according to the guidelines outlined in the Resolution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the crediting of Justice Salazar-Fernando's services as MTC Judge: The Court GRANTED this request, citing Section 42 of BP 129, which provides for longevity pay for "continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary." Her service as MTC Judge from February 15, 1983, to July 31, 1987, was undisputed judicial service and thus should be included in the computation of her longevity pay. On the crediting of Justice Salazar-Fernando's services as COMELEC Commissioner: The Court DENIED this request. It reiterated that Section 42 of BP 129 exclusively recognizes service "in the Judiciary" for longevity pay. The COMELEC, being an agency independent of the Judiciary, its service cannot be considered judicial service for this purpose. The Court found her reliance on the Pardo ruling misplaced, as Pardo's case involved unique factual circumstances and a liberal interpretation of Section 3 of BP 129, which allowed for a single instance of service outside the Judiciary without breaking continuity, a situation not met by Justice Salazar-Fernando's multiple stints outside the Judiciary. On the crediting of Justice Gacutan's services as NLRC Commissioner for longevity pay: The Court DENIED this request. It emphasized that Section 42 of BP 129 is clear and explicit: five years of "continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary" are required for longevity pay. The NLRC is attached to the Executive Department, and service there cannot be credited as judicial service for longevity pay purposes. On the crediting of Justice Gacutan's services as NLRC Commissioner for retirement pay: The Court GRANTED this request. It cited Section 1 of RA 910, as amended, which explicitly states that service "in any other branch of the Government" is creditable for retirement purposes for Justices of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. Therefore, her NLRC service should be credited as part of her overall government service for retirement benefits. On the retroactive application of RA 9347 for Justice Veloso and general discussion: The Court DENIED Justice Veloso's motion for reconsideration. It held that RA 9347 does not expressly provide for retroactivity, and statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless otherwise stated. The Court also clarified that RA 9347 is not a curative statute. Furthermore, even if the rank of CA Justice was granted to NLRC Commissioners, service in the NLRC is not considered service in the Judiciary for longevity pay purposes under Section 42 of BP 129. Such service, however, may be credited for retirement purposes under RA 910. The Court stressed the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, emphasizing that Section 42 of BP 129 specifically grants longevity pay only to Justices and Judges for service "in the Judiciary." General laws granting equivalent ranks and benefits to executive positions cannot override this specific law. The Court rejected the argument for liberality in interpreting Section 42, stating it has no place when the law's terms are clear and do not allow for discretion, especially when it would amount to judicial legislation. Administrative constructions are merely advisory and not binding on the courts. The Court also distinguished "salary" from "longevity pay," with the latter being a benefit for service specifically within the Judiciary.
Main Doctrine
Service in the Judiciary is the sole basis for longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Services rendered in other branches of government, even if carrying equivalent ranks, salaries, and benefits, cannot be credited for longevity pay purposes. However, such services may be credited for retirement purposes under Republic Act No. 910.