Lopez Heirs v. Querubin

G.R. No. 155405 and G.R. No. 164092 · 2015-03-18 · J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: This case involves a protracted dispute over the registration of two parcels of land initiated decades ago by the forbears of the parties. The core of the dispute centers on the ownership and rightful registration of these properties, which were originally the subject of an application for registration of title filed by Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. in 1960. A decision in their favor was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in 1966. However, prior to the issuance of the decrees of registration, the subject properties were sold to Eugenio Lopez on September 23, 1970, with the vendors warranting to file the necessary motion for the titles to be issued in Lopez's name. Lopez took possession of the properties, but the decrees of registration remained unissued for many years. Procedural History: The procedural history is complex, involving two consolidated cases before the Supreme Court. G.R. No. 155405 stems from a petition for certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals' dismissal of a petition to set aside an order from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City. This RTC order concerned a petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession filed by the heirs of Alfonso Sandoval. G.R. No. 164092 arises from a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals' denial of the Lopez heirs' appeal from three RTC orders of Pasig City. These orders denied the Lopez heirs' motions to consider a deed of absolute sale in their favor and to nullify decrees of registration and certificates of title issued in the names of the original applicants. The Lopez heirs' motions were filed in the original land registration case (LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887) after the original applicants' counsel failed to fulfill their obligation to have the titles issued in Lopez's name. The Petition: In G.R. No. 155405, the Lopez heirs filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed their petition for certiorari. They argued that the issuance of a writ of possession was barred by the pendency of an appeal concerning the validity of the decrees and titles, that Imelda Rivera, representing the Sandoval heirs, lacked the legal capacity to sue, and that Rivera engaged in forum shopping. In G.R. No. 164092, the Lopez heirs also filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning their standing in the land registration proceedings and the propriety of their motion to impugn the decrees and certificates of title. The Supreme Court, in its consolidated decision, granted both petitions, setting aside the Court of Appeals' rulings and remanding the case to the RTC of Pasig City to hear the Lopez heirs' motions, subject to compliance with Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and nullifying the writ of possession issued in the Antipolo City case.

Issue(s)

Whether the Lopez heirs are proper parties-litigants in the land registration proceedings. Whether the Motion dated November 25, 1998, was the proper remedy to impugn the decrees and original certificates of title. Whether the pendency of an appeal from orders denying a motion to declare decrees and titles null and void bars the issuance of a writ of possession; and whether the Motion dated April 28, 1997, is moot. Whether respondent Imelda Rivera had the legal capacity to sue for the issuance of a writ of possession. Whether respondent Imelda Rivera was guilty of forum shopping (No Ratio provided in source). Whether the heirs of Spouses Alfonso Sandoval and Rosa Ruiz are bound by the Deed of Absolute Sale and its undertakings. Whether the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (No Ratio provided in source). Whether the petition involves legal issues (No Ratio provided in source). Whether estoppel or laches has set in (No Ratio provided in source). Whether the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) granted to Imelda Rivera was sufficient to authorize her to file a petition for a writ of possession.

Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petitions in both G.R. No. 164092 and G.R. No. 155405. It set aside the Court of Appeals' decisions in CA-G.R. CV No. 67515 and CA-G.R. SP No. 58162, and nullified the RTC of Antipolo City's Order dated March 24, 2000. LRC No. 98-2225 was dismissed. The RTC of Pasig City was ordered to proceed with hearing the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997, and Motion dated November 25, 1998, subject to compliance with Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604, and all derived transfer certificates of title, were recalled and ordered surrendered to the RTC of Pasig City for appropriate action.

Ratio Decidendi

On the standing of the Lopez heirs as parties-litigants (G.R. No. 164092): While the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' finding that the Lopez heirs did not automatically become parties-litigants in the land registration proceedings by merely filing a motion under Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, it acknowledged their significant stake in the outcome. Section 22 allows an interested party to present conveyance instruments before the decree of registration is issued, and the court may order the land registered subject to the conveyance or the decree issued in the name of the buyer. However, this provision does not automatically make the buyer a party to the case or require substitution of the applicant. Despite not being formal parties, their motion under Section 22 was sanctioned by law, and they were entitled to seek relief concerning the issuance of the decrees. On the propriety of the Motion dated November 25, 1998 (G.R. No. 164092): The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying the Lopez heirs' Motion dated November 25, 1998, as a collateral attack on the titles. The Lopez heirs did not attack the original Decision dated May 31, 1966, but rather the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the decrees and titles, which they alleged were improvidently issued and contained patent errors. The Court clarified that Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides a remedy for correcting such errors or entering new interests, and a petition under this section should be filed in the original land registration case. The Court determined that the Lopez heirs' situation warranted the application of Section 108, allowing them to seek correction of the erroneous issuance of titles. On the mootness of the Motion dated April 28, 1997 (G.R. No. 164092) and the Issuance of the Writ of Possession (G.R. No. 155405): The Court disagreed with the trial court's theory that supervening events rendered the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997, moot. It held that the land registration court did not lose jurisdiction despite the irregular issuance of decrees by the LRA. The Court reasoned that the situation was an exception to the general rule, as the motion was filed before the decrees were issued and was still pending when the decrees were improvidently issued. The Court emphasized that the case was a continuation of the original land registration proceedings, not a separate action, and that Section 108 provided a mechanism for rectification within the original case. The Court ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is not ministerial when there are actual possessors claiming ownership. Citing Mendoza v. Salinas, the Court stated that the land registration court's duty to issue a writ of possession ceases with respect to actual possessors under a claim of ownership, who must be resorted to judicial process for recovery. The Lopez heirs claimed ownership and possession, and their claim was supported by their predecessor's possession and titles registered in Lopez, Inc.'s name. Furthermore, the Sandoval heirs were not entitled to a writ of possession based solely on OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604, as these titles also included the Ozaeta spouses, who affirmed the sale to Eugenio Lopez. On the sufficiency of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) for Imelda Rivera (G.R. No. 155405): The Court found the SPA granted to Imelda Rivera insufficient to authorize her to file a petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession. The SPA specifically authorized her to sell certain parcels of land and receive payment, and to 'witness in Court,' but did not explicitly grant authority to file a petition for a writ of possession. The Court noted the discrepancy in property descriptions between the SPA and the subject properties, and crucially, Evelyn Sandoval's manifestation that she did not authorize anyone to file the petition. The Court reiterated that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and followed. No Ratio provided in source On the binding effect of the Deed of Absolute Sale on heirs (G.R. No. 164092): The Court affirmed that under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, heirs are bound by the contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest. This principle was applied to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Sandovals and Ozaetas in favor of Eugenio Lopez. The Court cited Santos v. Lumbac to emphasize that rights and obligations are transmitted by succession, and heirs inherit the property subject to liabilities affecting their ancestor. Therefore, the Sandoval heirs could not escape the effects of the Deed of Absolute Sale. No Ratio provided in source No Ratio provided in source No Ratio provided in source No Ratio provided in source

Main Doctrine

A motion filed under Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, seeking to have a deed of conveyance considered in relation to an application for land registration before the issuance of the decree, is a proper remedy. However, if decrees and titles have already been issued, a petition under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is the appropriate remedy to correct errors or introduce new interests, and such a petition must be filed in the original land registration case. A writ of possession, while generally ministerial, may be stayed if there are claims of actual possession under a claim of ownership, requiring a separate judicial action to resolve ownership disputes.

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