Soriano v. Fernandez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Hilario P. Soriano (petitioner) alleged that on September 8, 1999, Romeo L. Santos executed a Deed of Assignment transferring a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-43029 to Soriano Holdings Corporation. However, petitioner could not register the Deed of Assignment. Meanwhile, First Coconut Rural Bank, Inc. (First Coconut), a lessee of the land, received a writ of possession on August 25, 2003, directing them to vacate the premises. First Coconut discovered that the land was subject to litigation between Santos and Ma. Teresa Robles, and that an RTC order dated January 28, 2002 had divested Spouses Santos of their title and vested it in Robles, directing the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-43029 and issue a new one in Robles' name after payment of proper taxes and fees. The RTC's order stemmed from a prior order on February 28, 2001, which directed Spouses Santos to cause a Deed of Absolute Sale to be notarized and delivered to Robles, and to surrender TCT No. T-43029, while Robles was to execute a Special Power of Attorney for the sale of the property and division of proceeds. Spouses Santos failed to comply, leading to a writ of execution on September 25, 2001, and subsequently, an order for the issuance of a writ of possession on January 28, 2002. On August 27, 2003, First Coconut filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Possession. Respondent Atty. Adonis C. Cleofe, Acting Registrar of Deeds, canceled TCT No. T-43029 and issued a new TCT in Robles' name without payment of proper taxes and fees. Petitioner questioned this action, and not being satisfied with Atty. Cleofe's reply, filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against Atty. Cleofe. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a criminal complaint on February 27, 2004, with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Atty. Cleofe for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Petitioner alleged that Atty. Cleofe gave unwarranted advantage to Robles by illegally canceling TCT No. T-43029 and issuing a new TCT without payment of taxes and fees, causing undue injury to First Coconut, Soriano Holdings Corporation, and the Government. Atty. Cleofe, in his counter-affidavit, argued that the complaint was a form of harassment, that the payment of capital gains tax was not applicable to involuntary transactions, and that the RTC order divested Spouses Santos of title. He also claimed petitioner's ire stemmed from the unregisterability of the Deed of Assignment due to lack of spousal consent. On August 30, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Floriza A. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause, finding no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and noting that Atty. Cleofe was guided by an LRA ruling in a similar case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 1, 2005. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing his criminal complaint, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against Atty. Adonis C. Cleofe. Whether Atty. Cleofe committed a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 by canceling TCT No. T-43029 and issuing a new TCT in the name of Ma. Teresa Robles without the payment of proper taxes and fees.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondents in dismissing the charge against Atty. Cleofe.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and the dismissal of the complaint: The Court reiterated the settled rule that the discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in determining probable cause cannot be interfered with unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petitioner failed to establish such grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause was based on the evidence presented, which did not sufficiently establish the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence required under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman has the plenary and unqualified power to investigate and prosecute, and its discretion to dismiss a complaint for want of palpable merit is well-established. The petitioner's allegations were deemed insufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith afforded to public officials acting in the discharge of their duties. The Court noted that the petitioner did not demonstrate any of the exceptional circumstances that would warrant judicial interference with the Ombudsman's findings, such as those involving constitutional rights, oppression, multiplicity of actions, or patent illegality. The dismissal was therefore upheld as a valid exercise of the Ombudsman's authority. On whether Atty. Cleofe committed a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019: The Court found that the elements of the crime were not sufficiently established. While Atty. Cleofe was a public officer discharging official functions, the other elements – that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and that his acts caused undue injury or gave unwarranted benefits – were not proven. The Ombudsman noted that Atty. Cleofe was not actuated by malice or bad faith and did not gain pecuniary benefit; instead, he was guided by the ruling in LRA Consulta Case No. 2402, which held that payment of transfer tax, capital gains tax, and documentary stamp tax did not apply to transfers pursuant to a court order. The Court agreed that Atty. Cleofe's adherence to this ruling indicated good faith. Furthermore, as a Register of Deeds, he was bound to obey such rulings, and the petitioner's recourse, if he disagreed, was to elevate the matter in consulta to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) Commissioner, a procedure the petitioner failed to undertake. The Court also pointed out that the petitioner did not specify the exact fees whose non-collection caused undue injury to the government, and the absence of a Deed of Absolute Sale, which was essential for determining the consideration, further weakened the charge. Therefore, Atty. Cleofe could not be justly accused of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Main Doctrine
The discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in determining probable cause is not subject to interference absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Public officials are presumed to act in good faith in the performance of their duties, and this presumption can only be overcome by substantial evidence of malice, bad faith, or gross negligence.