Vargas v. Cajucom
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Fortunato Cajucom filed a complaint for mandamus and abatement of nuisance against the Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, Marcial Vargas, the Municipal Engineer, Raymundo del Rosario, and several private individuals. Cajucom alleged that illegal structures built by the private individuals on the road shoulder obstructed access to his intended gasoline station business. Despite demands, the structures were not removed, and the municipal officials allegedly failed to act on his complaints. Cajucom sought a court order compelling the mayor and engineer to cause the removal of these illegal structures. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 86, ruled in favor of Cajucom on February 14, 2001, ordering the municipal mayor and engineer to comply with their legal duty to remove illegally constructed structures. This decision became final and executory as no appeal was filed. A writ of execution was issued on May 11, 2001, and served on the petitioners. Subsequently, the private defendants filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was denied. Their subsequent petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court was also denied. Cajucom then filed a motion to compel the petitioners to implement the writ of execution and explain why they should not be cited for contempt. The petitioners filed a motion to quash the writ of execution. On September 15, 2005, the RTC denied the motion to quash and granted a period for the petitioners to implement the decision, issuing a writ of mandamus for this purpose, while suspending the contempt proceedings. The Petition: Petitioners Mayor Marcial Vargas and Engr. Raymundo del Rosario filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, assailing the RTC's order denying their motion to quash the writ of execution. They argued that the writ compelled the municipal engineer to exercise the mayor's powers, that it forced the mayor to perform a discretionary duty, that Cajucom failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that Cajucom lacked a clear right to mandamus, that the writ was incapable of enforcement, and that it varied the judgment. The Supreme Court, however, found that the grounds raised by the petitioners pertained to the merits of the case, which had already been decided with finality and were not proper grounds to quash a writ of execution. The Court affirmed the RTC's order, emphasizing that once a judgment is final and executory, its execution is a ministerial duty, and new issues cannot be raised to object to its enforcement.
Issue(s)
Whether the writ of execution should be quashed. Whether the writ of execution compels the municipal engineer to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the municipal mayor; and whether the writ of execution compels the municipal mayor to perform a discretionary duty. Whether respondent Cajucom exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the petition for mandamus; and whether respondent Cajucom had a well-defined, clear, and certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus. Whether the writ of execution is capable of being enforced. Whether the writ of execution varies the judgment.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Order dated September 15, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 86, is AFFIRMED. The parties and the officers of the court below are hereby ORDERED to IMPLEMENT the writ of execution with dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the general principle of execution of final and executory judgments and grounds for quashing the writ of execution: The Court reiterated the consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course. The issuance of such a writ is a ministerial duty of the trial court, provided it conforms substantially to the judgment. The Court emphasized that parties are generally not allowed to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under specific circumstances such as when the writ varies the judgment, execution becomes inequitable due to changed circumstances, the property is exempt, the controversy was not submitted to the court, the judgment terms are unclear, or the writ was improvidently issued, defective, against the wrong party, or the judgment debt was paid or satisfied. The principle of immutability and unalterability of a final and executory judgment was stressed, stating that it cannot be modified except for clerical errors or void judgments. The Court found that the grounds raised by the petitioners, such as the writ compelling the engineer to exercise the mayor's powers, forcing the mayor to perform a discretionary duty, lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the judgment obligee's lack of a clear right, all go into the substance and merits of the case. These issues had been decided with finality in the original decision and were also raised and denied in the petition for annulment of judgment filed by co-defendants. Therefore, these issues could not be raised to quash the writ of execution, as doing so would constitute a re-litigation of settled matters. The Court noted that the petitioners failed to demonstrate how the writ fell under any of the recognized exceptions for quashing a writ of execution. On whether the writ of execution compels the municipal engineer to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the municipal mayor; and whether the writ of execution compels the municipal mayor to perform a discretionary duty: The Court affirmed that the duty to order the demolition or removal of illegally constructed structures on road shoulders, as mandated by the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules, is a duty that can be compelled by mandamus. The Court distinguished between discretionary and ministerial duties, noting that while some aspects of a mayor's functions may be discretionary, the duty to act on illegal structures on public roads, especially after a court order, falls within the realm of enforceable duties to maintain public order and welfare. The failure to act on such matters, despite a final and executory judgment, constitutes a failure to perform a legal duty that can be compelled by mandamus. On whether respondent Cajucom exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the petition for mandamus; and whether respondent Cajucom had a well-defined, clear, and certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus: The Court found that the grounds raised by the petitioners, such as the writ compelling the engineer to exercise the mayor's powers, forcing the mayor to perform a discretionary duty, lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the judgment obligee's lack of a clear right, all go into the substance and merits of the case. These issues had been decided with finality in the original decision and were also raised and denied in the petition for annulment of judgment filed by co-defendants. Therefore, these issues could not be raised to quash the writ of execution, as doing so would constitute a re-litigation of settled matters. On the enforceability of the writ: Petitioners argued the writ was unenforceable because Mayor Vargas had left office. The Court found this argument untenable, noting that Mayor Vargas had two incumbencies during which the writ could have been enforced, and he was served with the writ well within his term. The Court pointed out that the writ was directed at the office of the mayor, not the person, making it irrelevant which mayor served at the time of enforcement. The failure to enforce was attributed to the petitioners' refusal, not the writ's unenforceability. The Court also highlighted that the enforcement period (five years) had not yet expired. On whether the writ varies the judgment: Petitioners claimed the writ varied the judgment by allegedly requiring demolition, whereas the judgment only ordered compliance with duties. The Court clarified that the writ faithfully reproduced the dispositive portion of the judgment, which ordered compliance with legal provisions. These provisions, specifically Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules, outline three alternative duties: requiring owners to obtain permits, making necessary changes, or ordering demolition/removal. The Court explained that due to the inherent illegality of structures built on public property, the first two alternatives were not enforceable. Therefore, enforcement was limited to demolition, not as a variation of the judgment, but as the only practical and necessary means to effectuate the judgment, considering the factual findings that the structures were on a public highway and obstructed passage. The Court emphasized that a judgment must be considered in its entirety, and its enforcement extends to what is necessarily included or required to give it effect.
Main Doctrine
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, its execution is a matter of right and the court's duty is ministerial. A motion to quash a writ of execution may only be granted on grounds that vary the judgment, render execution inequitable, involve exempt property, show the controversy was not submitted to the court, have unclear judgment terms, or indicate the writ was improvidently issued, defective, against the wrong party, or the judgment was satisfied. Issues that go into the merits of the case, which were already decided with finality, cannot be raised to quash a writ of execution.