Aguinaldo v. Ventus
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez. They alleged that in March and April 2002, petitioners convinced them to part with P260,000.00 in exchange for two motor vehicles. Petitioners allegedly misrepresented that Aguinaldo owned these vehicles, but they were actually leased from LEDC Rent-A-Car by its manager, Levita De Castro. Procedural History: The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila recommended the indictment of both petitioners for estafa. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, and a warrant of arrest was issued. Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration and to withdraw the Information, asserting that respondents were aware the vehicles were leased, not owned by Aguinaldo. The RTC initially granted a motion to withdraw the warrant for Aguinaldo and archived the case pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration with the OCP. Subsequently, Levita De Castro filed a motion to reinstate the case and issue a warrant of arrest, which the RTC granted, citing the dismissal of a petition for review by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the expiration of the 60-day period for suspending arraignment. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, and their arraignment was set. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed their petition. They then filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the CA's decision, arguing that the RTC erred in reinstating the case and issuing an arrest warrant based on a motion filed by Levita De Castro, who is not a party to the case. They also contend that the RTC erroneously relied on a DOJ resolution concerning a different case and that the 60-day period for suspending arraignment is merely directory. Furthermore, they claim the preliminary investigation was not completed. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the CA's ruling. While acknowledging the RTC erred in reinstating the case based on De Castro's motion and an incorrect DOJ resolution, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the arrest warrant and setting the arraignment, given the liberal application of the 60-day rule and the opportunity afforded to petitioners during the preliminary investigation. The Court directed the remand of the case for trial on the merits.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was filed by Levita De Castro, who is not a party to the criminal case. Whether a procedural technicality that the suspension allowed for arraignment is beyond the 60-day period may be relaxed in the interest of an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Whether the preliminary investigation on I.S. No. 02L-51569 has not yet been completed.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits with dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue: The Court agreed with the petitioners that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was improperly filed by Levita De Castro, who was neither a party nor a private complainant but merely a witness. Therefore, the public respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to expunge and treated De Castro's motion as having no legal effect. The Court also noted that the RTC erroneously relied on a DOJ Resolution dismissing a petition for review in a different case, when the petitioners' actual petition was still pending. On the second issue: The Court disagreed with the petitioners' contention that the 60-day period for suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is merely directory. Citing jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension, this is limited to 60 days. After the expiration of this period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused. The Court found that the period of suspension in this case was more than ample, and the delay in the DOJ's resolution did not extend the prescribed period. Furthermore, petitioners could be faulted for the delay in the DOJ's resolution due to their late submission of required pleadings. On the third issue: The Court found petitioners' argument that the Information was filed prematurely due to an incomplete preliminary investigation to be misplaced. While the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, the petitioners were afforded their right to be heard. Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit, and Aguinaldo, though not personally informed of the preliminary investigation, was given an opportunity to be heard through her motion for reconsideration, which relied on Perez's affidavits. The Court emphasized that due process requires an opportunity to be heard, which was satisfied in this case through pleadings.
Main Doctrine
The pendency of a petition for review with the Department of Justice does not automatically warrant an indefinite suspension of arraignment; the 60-day period prescribed by the Rules of Court must be observed, and trial courts are not precluded from proceeding with the arraignment after such period has lapsed, absent compelling reasons. Furthermore, a motion to reinstate a case and issue a warrant of arrest, if filed by a party not privy to the case, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.