Nation Petroleum Gas v. Rizal Commercial Banking
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed a complaint against petitioner corporation, Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. (NPGI), and its directors and officers for civil damages arising from estafa and violations of the Trust Receipts Law. The respondent also sought a writ of preliminary attachment, which was granted, leading to the levy of various real and personal properties belonging to the petitioners. 2. Procedural History: Following the issuance of the writ of attachment, the sheriff served summons, the complaint, and related documents upon the petitioners. Petitioners, through counsel, filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons due to improper service of summons. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied this motion, finding that the service was valid and that the petitioners had ultimately received notice. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, prompting the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenges the CA's affirmation of the RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss. The petitioners contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant corporation because summons was served upon a mere liaison officer, not an authorized corporate officer. They also argue that summons was improperly served upon the individual petitioners through substituted service, as the sheriff failed to make diligent efforts for personal service and did not strictly comply with the requirements for substituted service. The petitioners seek to reverse the decisions of the lower courts, arguing for the dismissal of the complaint and the discharge of the writ of attachment.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation by service of summons upon its mere employee. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the individual defendants by resorting to substituted service of summons despite absence of earnest efforts on the part of the serving officer to serve summons personally.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The December 12, 2007 Decision and June 17, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, sustaining the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction over the defendant corporation: The Court held that service of summons upon Claudia Abante, a liaison officer, was valid. This was because Abante received the summons upon the express instruction of Melinda Ang, the corporate secretary, who is an officer competent to receive summons. Therefore, Abante acted as an agent of the corporate secretary, and the corporation, through its corporate secretary, is deemed to have constructively received the summons. The Court invoked the principle of estoppel, stating that the corporation, having instructed Abante to receive the summons, is precluded from impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of invalid service. Furthermore, the sheriff's report, stating that Melinda Ang gave telephone instructions, is accorded weight due to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, which requires clear and convincing evidence to overcome. The denials by Ang and Abante were considered self-serving and insufficient to overturn this presumption. On the jurisdiction over the individual defendants: The Court found that the service of summons upon the individual petitioners through substituted service was improper. The sheriff's report merely stated that copies were served at their addresses, but they refused acknowledgment, without detailing the efforts made to serve summons personally. The Court emphasized that substituted service requires stringent compliance with Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14, including demonstrating the impossibility of prompt personal service through several attempts on at least two different dates, and providing specific details in the return. The respondent's explanation that the individual defendants were evading service and that their residences were far apart was found insufficient. The Court noted that the attempts at personal service and property levy occurred on the same day, which did not allow for "several attempts" within a "reasonable time" as required by Manotoc v. Court of Appeals. Moreover, the house helpers who received the summons were not shown to be of suitable age and discretion with the capacity to understand the import of the summons and the duty to notify the defendants. Despite this improper service, the individual petitioners were deemed to have submitted to the court's jurisdiction through their voluntary appearance by praying for affirmative reliefs in their motion to dismiss, such as the discharge of the writ of attachment.
Main Doctrine
Service of summons upon a corporation through its corporate secretary's agent (liaison officer) is valid and confers jurisdiction, especially when the corporation subsequently seeks affirmative relief. However, substituted service upon individual defendants is invalid if the sheriff's return does not sufficiently detail the efforts made to serve summons personally and the impossibility of prompt personal service.